Relationship between the executive and legislative authority in South Africa with reference to the role of the leader of government business in the legislative and oversight processes by Calvert, Vanessa Yvonne
  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA WITH REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE LEADER OF 
GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
 
 
 
By: Vanessa Yvonne Calvert 
 
Student Number: 9339120 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr Leon G. Pretorius 
 
 
 
 
A mini thesis submitted to the School of Government, University of the Western 
Cape, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Degree of Masters in Public 
Administration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication, acknowledgements, declaration, abstract, table of contents and 
abbreviations  
 
 
ii 
 
DEDICATION  
 
To former President Nelson Mandela, late Minister Steve Tshwete (Leader of 
Government Business 1995 – 1999), Dr Frene Ginwala, Speaker of the National 
Assembly 1994 -2004) and Rev Arnold Stofile (Chief Whip ANC 1994 – 1996) for 
the wisdom and vision shown in 1994 in setting up an office in Parliament to be 
the link between the Executive and Parliament. To Jacob Zuma who, since 
1999, has shown great leadership as the Leader of Government Business in 
promoting the accountability of the Executive and advocating respect for the 
separation of powers, appreciating the role that the legislature has to play in 
the legislative process to strengthen South Africa‟s democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication, acknowledgements, declaration, abstract, table of contents and 
abbreviations  
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
At the completion of this Thesis, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 
Dr Leon G. Pretorius, my supervisor, for his guidance, constructive criticism 
insightful suggestions, wisdom and time in engaging in robust debate to 
improve the study which has enabled me to complete this work. 
 
To Dr Nazeem Ismail for the time and energy that he sacrificed to assist me.  
 
To Michael Plaatjies, my friend and colleague, for being a sounding board. For 
the knowledge and wisdom and lively debate on the topic and continously 
relating it to the current situation. 
 
To Judy Cornish for the administrative support provided that enabled me to 
complete the work. 
 
To my dear friend Jessica Longwe, who continued to be a source of inspiration. 
 
To Monica, my domestic worker, for managing the household, while I tried to 
balance my time between work, study and home.  
 
Last, but not least, to my husband Rocky, my son Matthew and my daughter 
Kirsten for your continued support, encouragement and understanding in 
ensuring the completion of this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication, acknowledgements, declaration, abstract, table of contents and 
abbreviations  
 
 
iv 
 
DECLARATION  
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this Thesis  
“RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA WITH REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE LEADER OF GOVERNMENT 
BUSINESS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES” IS my own original 
work and has not previously been submitted at any tertiary institution for a 
degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
................................      ........................ 
 
VY Calvert        1 November 2011 
 
 
 
 
Dedication, acknowledgements, declaration, abstract, table of contents and 
abbreviations  
 
 
v 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA WITH REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE LEADER OF 
GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature in South Africa is 
determined by the Constitution. The study focuses on the separation of powers 
in a single party-dominant system and examines the role of the Leader of 
Government Business in parliamentary processes. 
 
The Leader of Government Business is appointed by the President in terms of 
Section 91(4) of the Constitution. The role is outlined in the terms of National 
Assembly Rule (150), while the functions have been developed over time since 
1994. Though an executive function an office in parliament was established to 
act as conduit between the executive and the legislature on matters relating to 
the legislative and oversight processes. 
 
The office mainly fulfills its role by monitoring government‟s legislative 
programme and ensuring that government‟s priorities are achieved. Over the 
past 15 years, the office of the LOGB has developed into one that performs a 
dual function supporting both the executive and the legislature. Parliament 
relies more and more on this office in executing its oversight responsiblities 
with regard to the functions of programming in ensuring the availability of the 
executive, tracking matters of executive compliance and tracking vacancies in 
institutions that support democracy.  
 
The study employed a combination of research methods. It used a desk top 
study approach by consulting relevant literature on the subject matter. 
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Interviews were conducted with both politicians and relevant officials in the 
South African Parliament and the House of Commons in Britain to gauge their 
perceptions, knowledge and experiences in respect of the role of the executive 
and the legislature in the legislative and oversight processes. Reports of 
Portfolio and Select Committees on deliberations during the legislative and 
oversight processes were consulted.  
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1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT  
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature1 in the legislative 
and oversight processes is complex, yet dynamic and robust, with 
interdependent responsibilities and power-sharing among these two arms of 
government. The Constitution bestows on the Executive the responsibility to 
draft policy in the context of a legal framework, which in essence gives effect 
to a „draft bill‟ which is then referred to Parliament for consideration and 
deliberation. Likewise, the Constitution bestows on the Legislature the 
responsibility to pass legislation which the Executive must implement.  
 
The legislature is part of the „State‟ and share in the responsibility to ensure 
that sound policy and laws are passed. Parliament‟s role is to represent the 
people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. This is 
done through facilitating public involvement in the legislative process and 
having political oversight over the Executive. The extent to which the 
legislative arm of government effectively fulfils this role depends on the 
balance of power between itself and the executive. This balance of power can 
also shift, depending on the political will on the part of both the legislature 
and the executive. The factors that impact on the power relations are complex 
and dynamic. 
 
The thesis examines the relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislature with specific reference to the legislative process and investigates 
how the „power-relations‟ are managed to enhance good democratic 
governance. The study focuses on the role of the Leader of Government 
                                                 
1 In the context of the separation of powers the term legislature is used. The doctrine of the separation of powers refers to the distinct 
but related roles, responsibilities, and functions of the three arms of government, namely the executive, legislature and judiciary.  
Parliament depicts the way in which the doctrine is applied and interpreted, it depicts a particular system that influences the way in 
which politicians are elected to positions;policies and laws are made; and structures, practices and processes are designed 
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Business in the parliamentary processes, while taking cognisance of the 
legislature‟s constitutional mandate, and highlights the separation of political 
power and legislative oversight over the executive.  
 
The chapter is organised into 6 sections. Section 1 provides an introduction to 
the thesis, Section 2 provides the background and context, Section 3 discusses 
the problem statement, Section 4 deals with the objectives, purpose and 
significance of the study. Section 5 outlines the methodology in terms of the 
scope, design and its limitations and Section 6 provides an outline and the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
The South African Parliament has achieved much over the past 15 years of 
democracy. Since its inception in 1994 the democratically elected Parliament 
has undergone fundamental transformation in shaping itself into an institution 
that can effectively play its constitutional role in meeting the needs and 
expectations of the electorate. Mr Sindiso Mfenyana, the Secretary to 
Parliament 1996 to 2004, described his first encounter in the new Parliament 
(National Assembly Guide to Procedure: 2004: 1) 
 
“When the new Democratic Parliament was opened on 9 May 1994, 
more than half of the members sworn in had never set foot in the 
South African Parliament, let alone understand the procedures to 
be followed. The form of address varied from „Honourable‟ and 
„Comrade‟ and the dress code was simply defined as „clean and 
decent‟ in keeping with the prevailing weathe.r”  
 
Before the advent of a democratic Parliament in 1994, the Office of the Leader 
of Government Business did not exist. Rather, it was the Chief Government 
Whip, Venter‟s Notes (1983: 575 (20)) who played a strategic political role, 
liaising between the executive and parliament in ensuring that the 
government‟s programme was given priority in Parliament. In addition there 
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was a Leader of the House, who was responsible for the day-to-day business of 
the House, which included private members‟ legislation and requests from 
opposition parties for debates. Venter‟s Notes (1983: 575 (30)) indicates that 
business of the executive was indeed referred to as Government Business and 
debated in the House on a day specified for Government Business.  
 
Dr. Frene Ginwala, former Speaker of the National Assembly from 1994 to 2004 
described the concerns that confronted the newly incumbent Members of 
Parliament in forging a new and more appropriate role for the first 
democratically elected parliament (Budget Vote debate: 10 June 2003).  
 
“In 1994, for those of us, and it was the majority, who had never 
previously entered these buildings and had no experience of 
governance, the concern would have been; how would we be able 
to cope with the responsibilities and tasks, whose dimensions, 
scope and detail we are unaware. It is inevitable, that faced with 
the day-to-day difficulties of functioning with inadequate 
resources, inappropriate facilities and systems, and poorly 
managed support systems, we may be overwhelmed by frustration, 
and fail to see the considerable achievements of this Parliament.”  
 
Prior to 1994, the Government Chief Whip attended Cabinet meetings whilst 
also being the second most senior Member of Parliament after the Speaker 
(Venter‟s Notes: 1983). In the new dispensation the Chief Whip of the Majority 
Party is the most senior among all whips and is not a member of the Cabinet. 
The LOGB is responsible for ensuring that government priorities are met in 
Parliament (National Assembly Rule 150).  
 
Legislatures throughout the world are continually evolving, taking into account 
best practice, Constitutions, socioeconomic issues and political power. South 
Africa is no exception. Most liberal democacies have adopted some form of 
parliamentary government. The South African Parliament is largely based on 
the British Parliamentary System (incorporating the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords) also known as the Westminster system (Heywood: 2007: 337). 
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In the Westminster system the Leader of the House is appointed by the Prime 
Minister to ensure that the government‟s legislative programme is achieved. In 
terms of the South African Constitution, the President appoints the LOGB to 
ensure that government‟s legislative priorities are achieved in the legislature. 
 
South Africa pre- and post-1994 to a greater or lesser degree adopted much of 
what was Commonwealth practice and tradition. In both the Westminster and 
the South African systems, parliamentary committees mirror State 
Departments. The committee system is used to call members of the executive 
to account, individually and collectively, to Parliament on matters under their 
responsibility. The opportunity for Members of Parliament to put questions to 
the executive is an oversight tool that is relished in both systems of 
government. Some practices such as the Leader of Government Business (LOGB) 
in South Africa was modified from Leader of the House to give this position a 
broader area of responsibility in terms of government priorities. The LOGB  not 
only deals with matters relating to programming, but also facilitates 
communication on other aspects of government priorities, for example, 
ensuring that Parliament and the Executive have a common understanding on 
issues relating to the filling of vacancies on the SABC Board (June 2009), and 
other statutory bodies. Although the South African Parliament has borrowed 
extensively from the Westminster system, certain parliamentary practices and 
procedures, as illustrated above, were modified and adapted to meet South 
Africa‟s requirements.  
 
In South Africa the powers and functions of the Executive and the Legislature 
are enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution is itself a product of a 
protracted struggle and multi-party negotiating process (Parliament Since 1994: 
2006: 18). The Constitution-making process started before 1994 with the 
CODESA process. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa, commonly 
known as CODESA, was a forum that brought together the widest cross-section 
of political groups in South African history. CODESA endorsed a declaration of 
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intent committing all parties to support an undivided South Africa whose 
supreme law would be its Constitution. The declaration reflected an initial 
vision for the country‟s legislative authority. It envisaged a sovereign 
Constitution – an immediate shift from the Sovereign legislative arm that could 
act unchecked under apartheid. The separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with appropriate checks and 
balances was also agreed to (Parliament 2006: 15). 
 
The interim Constitution agreed to by the multiparty negotiators, and 
subsequently adopted by Parliament, was a compromise document scripted by 
negotiators from different political backgrounds and persuasions. The interim 
Constitution was adopted in December 1993 and became operative on 27 April 
1994.  
 
The implementation of the new Constitution on 8 May 1996 meant more change 
for Parliament and the way it operated. The principles of co-operative 
governance, the participation of the nine provinces through the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP), which has been in existence from 1997, the 
stronger oversight role of the legislative authority and a revitalised committee 
system signalled a break with the pure Westminster system inherited from the 
past.    
 
A central feature of South Africa‟s democratic Constitution is the doctrine of 
separation of powers, autonomous yet interdependent between the three 
spheres of government. The constitutional provisions enshrine the 
independence of the arms and enable it to act as checks and balances against 
one another, signifying a clear break from the apartheid past, in which the 
judiciary was not protected from the executive and the legislature and had no 
meaningful autonomy from Cabinet. Thus the Constitution provides for the 
legislature to play an oversight role over the executive arm, in addition to its 
legislative functions. While the principle of separation of powers acts as an 
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important constitutional guide, there are areas in which the three spheres 
overlap. Members of Cabinet retain their seats in Parliament and are therefore 
members of the legislature and the executive. Members of the judiciary are 
appointed by the President with the participation of the legislature and the 
judiciary through the Judicial Services Commission, established in terms of the 
Constitution.  
 
The founding provisions of the Constitution (1996) state that: “This 
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” For this 
reason all legislation is subject to the test of constitutionality. The President 
may thus not assent to and sign a bill if he/she has reservations about its 
constitutionality. The final test of the constitutionality of legislation lies with 
the Constitutional Court. The President may refer a bill to the Constitutional 
Court for a decision on its constitutionality. Members of the National Assembly 
may apply to the Constitutional Court for an order declaring that all or part of 
an Act of Parliament is unconstitutional. 
 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
Although a plethora of literature exists on the legislative authority, very 
limited literary and other information exists on the role and function of the 
Leader of Government Business. The system of proportional representation, 
with single-party dominance in both the legislature and the executive, impacts 
on the separation of powers, often resulting in a blurring of roles and 
responsibilities of the three spheres. The executive influences the legislature in 
the legislative and oversight processes. As Ministers are members of the study 
groups of the governing party, they often intervene at this level by discussing 
what is non-negotiable or by indicating what they are open to amending in 
respect of legislation. It is difficult to identify a clear and definite line 
between what is an executive function and what is a function of the legislature 
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as the executive must be involved in the parliamentary procedure of processing 
legislation. 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature within the 
legislative and oversight processes is skewed in favour of the executive, thus 
impacting on the legislature‟s constitutional obligation of passing legislation 
and conducting oversight over the executive and holding government 
accountable to it.  
 
1.4. OBJECTIVES, PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The primary objectives of the study are to focus on the doctrine of „Separation 
of Powers‟ and the role played by the Leader of Government Business in the 
legislative and oversight processes.  
 
The secondary and more specific objectives of the thesis include:  
 doing a literature review on the approaches, doctrine and philosophy of 
the separation of political power and legislative oversight over the 
executive  
 providing appropriate examples of how these approaches are practiced 
by drawing on international experiences 
 outlining and explaining the functions and role of the Leader of 
Government Business (LOGB) in relation to the legislative and oversight 
processes at the political level 
 examining the powers and responsibilities of the National Assembly in 
the legislative and oversight processes 
 reviewing the practices between the executive, legislature and the 
Leader of Government Business by highlighting relations that are in 
harmony or in conflict with one another 
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 conducting an analysis of the findings and identifying the factors that 
facilitate or constrain democratic practices in the legislative process and 
oversight processes  
 drawing conclusions and making recommendations for future best 
practice. 
 
The study is significant in that it outlines and discusses the role played by the 
executive authority through the Leader of Government Business in ensuring 
that the legislative priorities of government are achieved. All too often, 
however, one has had the sense that the administrative role of the office 
ventured into the sphere of the political arena, without a definite separation of 
administrative and political roles, the one complementing the other, with 
political imperatives being translated into the arena of administration. 
 
The study represents an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis to 
promote effective communication between the legislature and the executive, 
especially around legislative and oversight issues and programming of 
government business in Parliament. 
 
1.5. METHODOLOGY  
 
The study employs a combination of research methods. It is essentially a 
qualitative study including participatory observation2. It uses a desktop study 
approach by consulting relevant literature on the subject matter. Interviews 
were also conducted with both politicians and relevant officials in the South 
African Parliament to gauge their perceptions, knowledge and experiences in 
respect of the roles of the executive and the legislature in the legislative and 
oversight processes.  
                                                 
2
 The writer is a member of the South African LOGB  
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1.5.1. Scope 
 
The study focuses on the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in the National Assembly of the South African Parliament, and the 
influential role played by the LOGB in facilitating the legislative and oversight 
processes as areas of collaboration and contestation.  
 
1.5.2. Design  
 
In its design secondary data is gathered by reading the literature on 
comparative studies of other government systems and manuals of other 
selected Parliaments around the world. The reports of Portfolio and Select 
Committees on deliberations during the legislative and oversight processes are 
consulted. This secondary data is the main source of information used in the 
context and background of the study.  
 
Primary data was collected by conducting 30 semi-structured direct interviews 
with Members of Parliament and senior officials on their experiences relating to 
the role of the executive in the legislative oversight processes. The selection of 
the sample interviewed is based on the following categories: rank, seniority 
i.e. years‟ experience or post occupied, and party affiliation/membership and 
gender, taking into consideration the representation of the parliamentary 
population.  
 
The examples of cases used in chapter 3 are representative of cases in the 
category where there was harmony or discord.  Some are examples of the 
legislative process and others of the appointments of persons to statutory 
positions. These examples are analysed by a critical application of the 
framework approach based on the doctrine of the separation of powers 
referred to in Chapter 2. These examples comment on how the role of the 
LOGB enhances or constrains democracy. 
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1.5.3. Limitations of methodology 
 
The Study is limited as not much is written on the politically nuanced role of 
the LOGB within the parliamentary landscape. Transforming political 
imperatives into administration is an important role of the office of the LOGB, 
these processes have been developed over time since 1994. The findings are 
limited only to the South African experience and cannot be generalised as the 
context and details may differ.  
 
1.6. STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THESIS 
 
The thesis is organised in 5 Chapters. Chapter 1: Provides a general 
introduction to the study. Chapter 2: Focuses on the approaches, doctrine and 
philosophy of the separation of political power and legislative oversight over 
the executive. It also provides examples of how these approaches are practiced 
by means of international experiences. Chapter 3: Provides an empirical 
overview of the current legislative and oversight processes in Parliament as 
well as providing an overview of the interaction and relationship between the 
executive, the legislative authority and the Leader of Government Business in 
Parliament. Chapter 4: Provides an outline of the findings of the study and an 
analysis of the findings of the study in identifying the factors that facilitate or 
constrain democratic practices in the legislative and oversight processes. 
Chapter 5: Concludes the study and makes recommendations for further study 
and practice.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers - trias politica – is regarded as one of the 
oldest constitutional principles in politics and in constitutional law. It refers to 
the threefold separation of powers among the legislative authority, the 
executive authority and the judicial authority. The historian W.A. Rubson wrote 
in his well-known publication Justice and Administrative Law that the 
“divisions of labour between the legislature, executive and the judiciary is a 
necessary condition for the rule of law in contemporary society and therefore 
for government itself” (Wade and Bradely 1991: 50). 
 
This separation of powers among state institutions is significant in that it 
creates institutionalised mechanisms to balance the power relations between 
the three arms of government. The responsibility of the legislature to oversee 
government activities and government‟s accountability is at the base of the 
doctrine of the separation of powers. The separation of functions and powers 
promotes, enhances and strengthens democracy. The relationship between the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary should nevertheless be 
complementary in achieving the objectives of the government as society was 
promised in an election, rather than being adversarial. Ideally they all wish to 
accomplish the same objective and that is to deliver an effective and efficient 
service to the electorate. 
 
The diversity of models incorporating the separation of powers is recognised in 
most academic writing on the subject. The systems developed in each country 
depend on a host of factors, including the system of democracy adopted in that 
country, its sociopolitical and economic factors. Generally, there appears to be 
agreement among the various scholars that the accumulation of all power in 
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the same institution may lead to an abuse of power and eventually tyranny. In 
South Africa, the model of relationship between the executive and legislature 
closely resembles that of the Westminster system rather than that based on the 
Presidential System found in France and the United States of America.  
 
This chapter is important in that being able fully to appreciate and understand 
the role and functions of the LOGB vis-à-vis the Legislature in the South African 
context, one must have the theoretical knowledge in respect of the doctrine of 
separation of powers as well as the value added to the debate and thoughts on 
the subject by various scholars in the field.  
 
This chapter is organised in four sections. Section one is the introduction; 
section two provides a background and general overview of the doctrines, 
approaches and philosophy in respect of the separation of powers and 
legislative oversight over the executive. Section three discusses the different 
approaches to the separation of powers, i.e. the American Presidential System, 
the British Parliamentary System and both the South African apartheid and 
constitutional system of democracy (post–apartheid). Section four provides a 
summary of the chapter.  
 
2.2. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND OVERIEW OF THE DOCTRINE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS  
 
As alluded to earlier, the separation of powers among the different spheres of 
government is one of the oldest constitutional principles in politics. According 
to Labuschagne (2004: 85) the fundamental value of the separation of powers 
lies in its constitutional „checks and balances‟ to promote the constitutional 
control of state authority and to avoid the arbitrary exercising of powers. This 
role is in keeping with the ideal of a constitutional state (Basson1994: 144).  
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The doctrine of separation of powers entails that the freedom of citizens 
within a state can be protected only by a division of central institutionalised 
power, because the centralisation of power can potentially lead to abuse of 
power (Devenish 1998: 2). This division of authority is achieved by structural 
and functional separation of government‟s authority into legislative3, 
executive4 and judicial5 branches. These functions are then exercised by 
different personnel (Rautenbach & Malherber 1996: 68) (Van der Vyver 1973: 
177). The constitutional principle of separation of powers is a very important 
component of the maintenance of constitutional order. Almost all discussions 
of the trias politica doctrine start with reference to the two influential 
philosophers of the „Age of Reason‟ who made fundamental contributions to 
the development of this doctrine, namely John Locke and the Baron de 
Montesquieu. Although the concept of separation of powers was first mooted in 
the early 1600s by the Levellers movement in England, a substantial part of the 
credit for further development must go to Locke and Montesquieu.  
 
The First modern design of the doctrine of separation of powers was to be 
found in the constitutional theory of Locke. In his Second Treatise of Civil 
Government, (1632 – 1704) he noted that the temptations of corruption exist 
where “the same persons who have the powers of making laws also have in 
their hands the power to execute them ...”. Locke‟s views were part of a 
growing English radical tradition, but it was French philosopher, Baron de 
                                                 
3
 The Legislature is voted in by the citizens of the country at an election, which, in South Africa, is held 
every five years. It has the primary responsibility to pass legislation. The legislature also provides a 
national forum in which the public can participate in issues and it also watches over the Executive arm of 
government, thereby fulfilling its oversight and accountability functions. Members of Parliament, including 
the Deputy President, Ministers (except two) and Deputy Ministers (except two) constitute the legislature 
/Parliament.  
4 
The Executive has the responsibility to run the country and to make policies in the best interests of its 
citizens in terms of the Constitution. The Executive develops and initiates legislation linked to government 
policies. Importantly, it implements legislation passed by Parliament. The President, Deputy President, 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers constitute the executive. However, Deputy Ministers are not members of 
Cabinet. 
5
 The Judiciary is the system of courts which interprets and applies the laws of the country. Under the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary generally does not make laws. Instead it interprets the law 
and applies it to the facts in each case. The Chief Justice, Constitutional Court Judges, Supreme Court 
Judges, High Court Judges and Magistrates constitute the Judiciary. 
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Montesquieu (1689 – 1755), who articulated the fundamentals of the separation 
doctrine as a result of visiting England in 1729. 
 
In his The Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu considered that English liberty 
was preserved by its institutional arrangements. He saw not only „separation of 
powers‟ among the three main branches of English government, but within 
them, such as the decision–sharing power of judges with juries; or the 
separation of the monarch and Parliament within the legislative process 
(Labuschagne: 2003: 86). In Britain the Queen, as the Head of State, presents 
the government‟s legislative priorities in her annual address to the House of 
Lords, but these priorities are developed by the Prime Minister as the Head of 
Government and presented to the Queen.  
 
Locke‟s and Montesquieus‟ ideas found a practical expression in the American 
Revolution in the 1780s. Motivated by a desire to make impossible the abuse of 
power they saw as emerging from the England of George III, the framers of the 
Constitution of the United States adopted and expanded the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. In an effort to ensure the preservation of liberty, the 
three branches of government were both separated and balanced, as suggested 
by (Labuschagne: 2003: 86), whilst Madison (Federalist papers 303 on the 
British philosophy of the separation of powers) observed that “there was no 
watertight compartmentalisation of the three arms of government in Britain”, 
suggesting a co-existing and power-sharing relationship between the arms of 
government.  
 
Power thus divided should prevent absolutism, as in monarchies or 
dictatorships, in which all branches of government are concentrated in a single 
authority, or corruption arising from the opportunities presented by unchecked 
power. Sunstein ( 2001: 98), observes that the separation of powers also helps 
to energise government and to make it more effective by creating a healthy 
division of labour. 
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The doctrine can be extended to enable the three branches to act as „checks 
and balances‟6 over each other. The independence of each branch helps to 
prevent the other from exceeding its power, in so doing promoting the rule of 
law and protecting individual rights. The separation includes the extent to 
which the executive can control the legislative branch, or the extent to which 
the legislature can control the executive and hold it accountable and have 
oversight over it and the extent to which the legislative branch controls the 
capacity to legislate. 
Esau (2004: 42) theoretically articulates this relationship, 
“The doctrine of separation of powers is not aimed at an 
imbalance of power between the legislature and the executive, 
but at the balance of power between them. Any policy that the 
executive may want to implement is subjected to the approval of 
the legislature. In this manner the legislature exercises oversight 
over the powers of the executive.”  
Oversight7 is a term that is used to describe “supervision” of the Executive. 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2003: 420) describes oversight as a 
„watchful‟ care or management; supervision. What emerges from the wide 
spectrum of literature consulted on the subject, is that the doctrine of 
separation of powers in many Westminster constitutional arrangements contain 
a variety of principles which are often in tension with one another. According 
to O‟Regan (2005: 25) the doctrine of separation of powers rests on a 
functional understanding of the powers and requires that each institution‟s 
character and competence be protected in order to perform these powers. 
Indeed, the principle of separation of powers within any constitutional 
arrangement requires not only the need to protect against the abuse of state 
                                                 
6
 Checks and balances: Internal tensions within government that result from institutional fragmentation. 
(Heywood: 2007:339) 
7
 Oversight (author’s emphasis) can thus be defined as a crucial role of Parliament in monitoring and 
reviewing the actions of the executive organs of government. Oversight is an instrumental mechanism used 
by Parliament to oversee executive action and is crucial in ensuring in particular that democracy is 
strengthened. It is a proactive interaction initiated by Parliament to ensure that services are delivered to the 
citizens of the country. 
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power, but should also ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and institutional 
integrity of each of the three arms of government. 
 
2.3. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SEPARATION OF POWERS  
 
2.3.1. The American Presidential System  
 
FIGURE 1: American Presidential System 
 
 
Source: http://www.magazineusa.com/us/info/show 
 
The Figure 1 above illustrates the American Presidential System The 
constitutional drafters considered the American Presidential System as the best 
expression of the Separation of Powers. In this system of government the 
President is elected separately from Congress8, thus making a clear distinction 
between the separateness of the President (executive) and the Congress 
(legislature).  The fact that there are clearer lines of separation between the 
                                                 
8 
The terms Congress and Legislature are used interchangeably in relation to the American Presidential 
System. 
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arms of government in Presidential systems does not naturally imply that the 
legislature is more effective in exercising oversight over the executive. There 
are no political party Presidents in the USA, however, political parties do 
support Presidential Candidates. 
 
The American President is both the Head of State and Head of Government, as 
well as the commander-in-chief of the military. The Constitution bestows on 
the President the responsibility to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed.  
To carry out this responsibility, the President presides over the executive 
branch of the federal government. The President appoints Cabinet Secretaries 
(Ministers), who are not Members of Congress. This is done under the watchful 
eye of the Congressional committee that oversees the appointment of these 
persons to ensure their suitability for these positions. 
 
In addition, the President has important legislative powers. The President 
directly engages Congressmen and Women so that legislative compromises can 
be „struck‟ when necessary, in which case the President may address Congress 
or the Senate to motivate that legislation be approved. The President will use 
the support of certain Congressmen and Women to ensure that he receives the 
vote to assist with the passage of legislation. The President also has the power 
to veto legislation passed by Congress. Where the President vetoes legislation, 
it can only be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote in Congress. The 
President may not dissolve Congress or call special elections. 
 
According to Melissa Merson (Director: Communications Congressional Budget 
Office: 13 August 2010) on the President‟s submission of his annual budget 
proposals to Congress for approval.  
 
“The Congress has „equal power‟ with the President. The concept 
of equal power creates „natural tensions‟ between the executive 
and the legislature. Almost all of the time Congress votes down 
the President‟s budget requests. In essence, telling the President 
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that they have the „power‟ and will use it. Congress raises the 
taxes to spend and thus develops the budget.”  
 
The above quotation demonstrates the veto powers of Congress. Generally, 
Congress utilises these veto powers, but in the end they support the budget. 
President Obama‟s Budget request of 2011/12, was not approved until the very 
end of the process due to the Republican resistance to the President‟s jobs 
programme. (New York Times 15 02 2011) 
 
A two-thirds majority in Senate and a simple majority in Congress gives these 
instutitions the power to impeach9 and remove the President from Office in the 
event of allegations of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanours. The Presidential System, however, allows the President the 
power to force the legislature to act on legislation within a certain period. This 
„power‟ is used rather persuasively, as in the case of President Obama 
addressing Congress to support the Health Care Reform Bill (2008) (Washington 
Post 5 10 2009), which is described in further detail on page 20.  
 
The potential for congresstional legislative assertiveness is greater in 
presidential systems. Congress has the function to draft legislation and to pass 
its own bills. Congress drafts legislation often in close co-operation with the 
executive branch. Congress has the responsibility to monitor and influence 
aspects of the executive branch. Congress‟s oversight functions are efforts to 
prevent waste and fraud, protect civil liberties and individual rights, ensure 
executive compliance with the law, gather information for making new laws 
and educating the public, and to evaluate executive performance.  
 
Oversight mechanisms of Congress include the following: 
 Committee inquiries and hearings; 
 Formal consultations with and reports from the President; 
                                                 
9
 Impeachment: A formal process for the removal of a public official in the event of personal or 
professional wrongdoing. 
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 Senate advice and consent for Presidential nominations and for treaties; 
 House impeachment proceedings and subsequent Senate trials; 
 House and Senate proceedings under the 25th Amendment in the event 
that the President becomes disabled, or the office of the Vice President 
falls vacant; 
 Informal meetings between legislators and executive officials; 
 Congressional membership on governmental commissions; 
 Studies by congressional committees and support agencies such as the 
Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability Office, and 
the Office of Technology Assessment, all of which are arms of Congress. 
 
Congressional oversight is an implied rather than an enumerated power in the 
American Constitution.  The Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress the 
authority to conduct any of the above-mentioned mechanisms to investigate 
the executive, or to issue subpoenas for documents or testimonies.  Historian 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. noted that „no provision in the American Constitution 
gave Congress express authority to conduct investigations and compel 
testimony. He added that the power to make laws implies the power to see 
whether they were executed. The legislature‟s authority to appropriate funds, 
enact laws, raise and support armies, declare war, and impeach the President 
could not be done without knowing what the executive was doing, how 
programmes were being administered, by whom and at what cost. Oversight by 
the legislative branch over the executive branch is necessary for Congress to 
ensure that the executive conducts its business in an accountable manner.  
American Presidents have great control over their cabinet appointees, who 
serve at the President‟s pleasure, and are usually selected for reasons other 
than the extent of their congressional support (as in parliamentary systems). 
This means that the President can appoint key persons within the country to be 
Cabinet Secretaries, who act as his advisors (Heywood 2007: 362). This may 
imply that the President appoints individuals who might have been key 
financial donors during the election campaign. In theory, having an executive 
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branch that is separate from Congress creates the notion that the doctrine of 
separation of powers is entrenched. This does not imply that the Presidential 
system is absolutely free of influence or interference by the branches. Whilst 
depicting separation, branches are dependent on one another for decision-
making. 
 
A recent example illustrates the interdependence of the executive and 
legislative branches during the protracted process of the proposed Health Care 
Reform Bill (introduced in 2008), which was finally approved on 23 March 2010. 
During the American Presidential Election campaign in 2008, Barack Obama 
promised that one of his key priorities on becoming President would be to 
provide free health care to all citizens who could not afford to pay for this 
basic service. The Republicans as the main opposition party did not support the 
view as they argued that it would be too costly for the taxpayer. After many 
months of negotiations, which included an unprecedented approach by 
President Obama to address Congress on the issue, and the President lobbying 
members to support the reform legislation, the Health Care Reform Bill was 
eventually passed by Congress in March 2010. 
 
Political parties in Presidential Systems tend to be less rigid than parties in 
Parliamentary Systems. Mphaisha (2000) highlights that failure to vote with 
one‟s party in the presidential system does not threaten to bring the 
government down. Whether Republican, or Democratic, members of the 
legislature have more freedom to identify with regional, ethnic, economic or 
other divisions when considering policy issues. An American President has to 
lobby hard for the support of interest groups whenever necessary.  
 
Balutis (1979: 54) articulates the relationship between the Executive and the 
Legislature in focusing more on relationship-building rather than formal 
processes. „Lobbying‟ in the presidential system, could be the term that best 
describes the processes of ensuring that government priorities are met. 
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Furthermore, Balutis (1979: 43) observed that whilst it is by now accepted that 
constitutions separate authority among the three spheres of government, there 
is a good deal of overlap among the institutions and that in fact they share 
power and responsibility. Freeman (1955: 1) noted, „It is in the relations of the 
Executive and the Legislative branches to each other and to their political 
environment that one‟s attention is drawn to the most crucial public decisions 
of the day that are made‟. In this regard Griffith (1954) alerted scholars to the 
importance of focusing upon the actual operation of the governmental process 
rather than the formal, legal structures that condition it. Furthermore, he 
suggests that „Networking or lobbying‟ between the branches of government 
are both key elements to ensure that government programmes are delivered. 
 
“One bridge between the branches is formed by the professional 
staff of the legislature and their counterparts in the executive 
(Ministries and State departments). In this study it is suggested 
that staff has become a well-travelled bridge between the 
legislature and the executive branches of government; his study 
describes the network of the interrelationships and 
communication.” 
 
2.3.1.a. The Leader of the House in the US Presidential System 
 
In the American Presidential System the Speaker acts as the Leader of the 
House and combines several roles: the institutional role of presiding officer and 
administrative head of the House , the role of the leader of the majority party 
in the House, and the representative role of an elected member of the House. 
The leader of the House is elected by the House of Representatives and the 
majority party in that House will support its candidate. The majority Leader 
determines the legislative agenda of the House, he/she oftens confers with the 
President and the Senate, and if they and the President are from the same 
party, he or she becomes the spokesperson for the administration. The role of 
the leader is to expedite the legislative business of the House. As described 
earlier, legislation could be introduced by any member of that House and is 
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drafted by a centralised structure that is independent of political affiliation.  
Legislative requests normally eminate from requests of constituents. 
 
 The majority party in the House could be different from the political party to 
which the President belongs.  The legislative priorities of government are 
therefore unlikely to be the same as that of the House of Representatives.  This 
is due to the nature of opposition politics and the legislative imperatives of 
each party being different.  In this regard, if the President and the majority 
membership in the House of Representatives were from the same party the 
government‟s legislative prioirities would not be subjected to the vigorous 
scrutiny that was described earlier, where the President addresses the House 
to defend government‟s legislative programme in order that the House may 
consider his request favourably.  
 
Following the political party senario, the Leader will unite the House to reject 
the government‟s legislative proposals that are not in line with his/her party‟s 
policy.  In this way the leader focuses on his party‟s policy, or his party‟s 
election promises.  Since 2011, the leader of the House majority has worked to 
make the legislative process more open and to ensure the priorities of the 
citizens are reflected in the priorities of the legislators.  In this regard the 
leader has iniated a process whereby bills are posted online at least three days 
before a vote in the House to gauge public opinion and in this way influence 
the decision of the House.  In addition, party policy committees generally 
discuss party positions on pending legislation. Party caucuses may decide to 
appoint „task forces‟ to perform research on new policy proposals, or to assist 
the leadership with developing a party position on important legislation. 
 
The separateness of the imperatives of government and the House of 
Representatives is reflected in the strong opposition by the House to the 
passing of government bills, as described earlier. The role of the leader in the 
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US system of government is powerful in that he/she can influence and change 
the direction of government  policy iniatives as introduced by the President. 
 
In 2011, Leader Boehner focused on removing government barriers to private 
sector job creation and economic growth, cutting government spending and 
reforming Congress.  Furthermore, the thrust was to build the bonds of trust 
between the American electorate and their representatives in Washington.  
 
The congressional oversight role is amplified in the legislative process as no bill 
is passed without being subjected to an intensive scrutiny process, during 
which the public is also consulted.  In the US Presidential system the „power‟ of 
the leader is not tilted in favour of the Executive and the President where they 
are not from the same political party. 
 
2.3.2. British Parliamentary (Westminster) System  
 
Unlike a presidential system, the central feature of a parliamentary system is a 
„fusion of powers‟ between the executive and legislative branches. (Heywood: 
2007: 338, Wade and Bradley 1991: 53). In referring to the separation of 
powers in the parliamentary system, Rautenbach and Malherbe (1996: 68) 
observe that Montesquieu developed his doctrine on the basis of a somewhat 
erroneous interpretation of the Westminster System, and they argue that: “the 
system is characterised by its extremely limited separation between the three 
branches of government”.  This „fusion‟ or limited separation is due to 
members of the executive maintaining their seats in the legislature. The Prime 
Minister is elected in the same way that all other members of the Legislature 
are elected. The Prime Minister is the leader of the party that wins the 
majority of votes. The Prime Minister appoints Cabinet Ministers. However, 
different from the presidential system, they are members of the Legislature 
from the ruling party. Thus, in a parliamentary system, the constituency of the 
Executive and the Legislature are the same. If the ruling party is voted out of 
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the Legislature, the Executive also changes. Continued co-operation between 
the Executive and Legislature is required for the government to survive and to 
be effective in carrying out its programmes.  
 
Britain represents the strongest form of parliamentary system – the 
Westminster system, often portrayed as the „mother of parliaments‟ (Heywood: 
2007: 337). Most Commonwealth countries have also adopted this approach, 
but with minor adjustments. In parliamentary systems, the Executive controls 
the legislative agenda, and individual legislators have little political power to 
introduce their own legislative initiatives. The Prime Minister and Cabinet 
initiates legislation affecting the budget or revenue. In the UK‟s Westminster 
system the legislature can only amend legislation on narrow, technical terms, 
not on policy matters, as these will have financial / budgetary implications 
which could lead to implementation constraints. 
 
In parliamentary systems there are significantly fewer committees with 
relatively few professional staff to help draft and review legislation. There are 
exceptions though. Germany‟s semi-parliamentary system has relatively strong 
committees where legislation can be initiated, reviewed and amended by 
individual members.  
 
The Prime Minister can be removed from office in two ways. The first is 
through a „no-confidence‟ motion, which is filed by the opposition or a 
coalition of opposition parties. The no confidence motion calls for a vote in the 
Legislature to demonstrate that the Legislature no longer has confidence in the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet of Ministers. If the vote is passed by a majority, 
the Executive, including the Prime Minister, is forced to step down. Since the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet of Ministers are members of the Legislature, this 
necessitates new parliamentary elections. The term of the Prime Minister, 
therefore, is generally linked to that of the rest of the Legislature. However, 
the Prime Minister can be removed by his/her own party members, in a setting 
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outside of the Legislature. For example, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was 
removed by party vote and replaced by John Major during the Conservative 
Party caucus. Such a removal, whereby the party decides to change its leader, 
does not force parliamentary elections. This also happened in the case of 
Gordon Brown replacing Tony Blair, who resigned to take up a diplomatic post, 
in 2008. Likewise, in South Africa, when the African National Congress (ANC) 
recalled President Thabo Mbeki in September 2008, and he was replaced by 
Kgalema Motlanthe, except that this recall sparked a number of resignations by 
Cabinet Ministers who were closely linked to President Mbeki. 
 
Parliamentary Systems in developed countries are characterised by parties that 
are highly structured and tend toward unified action, bloc voting and distinct 
party platforms (Wade & Bradley 1991: 3). This party discipline is required in 
parliamentary systems primarily because deviation from the party line could 
result in bringing down the government. Heywood (2007: 338), suggests that 
“parliamentary systems of government are often associated with the problem 
of executive dominance.” Parliamentary Systems require that the executive 
and legislative members come to an agreement on issues lest disagreement 
force the dissolution of the government. In addition, majority parties in 
parliamentary systems are perceived by voters to have a mandate to run the 
country. Therefore, each party may develop a system of punishment and 
reward. Individual members of the Legislature who deviate from a party vote 
may be punished by exclusion from their party within Parliament or may not be 
nominated by the party in the subsequent election. 
 
The following diagram illustrates the structures and functioning of the British 
Parliamentary system.  
 
FIGURE 2: The British Parliamentary System 
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Source: http://payvand.com/news/08/feb/British -Parliament1.jpg 
 
2.3.2.a Legislative drafting in a Parliamentary System 
 
In a parliamentary legislative system, the drafting of laws is situated in each 
Ministry. Every ministerial department employs its own legislative drafters. The 
Minister proposes a certain law to the Cabinet, and after Cabinet‟s approval, 
the Minister discusses the proposed law with the state law advisor, who will 
then start the drafting process. Each Ministry has its own drafters who are 
responsible for drafting and interpreting laws for that individual department or 
Ministry. 
 
The evolution of every bill is politically influenced, from the conceptual stage 
to adoption and finally the implementation stage. In a parliamentary system of 
government, the evolution of a law starts with the political party‟s campaign 
promises. At every step in the evolution of a bill, the drafter‟s personal and 
political agendas exert an unavoidable influence on the conceptual aspects. 
Not only does a drafter‟s „political agenda‟ influence priorities, but personal 
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considerations may also infiltrate the drafting process. It is therefore crucial 
for the drafter to understand the political agenda or campaign promises of the 
ruling party and the Ministry that he or she is working for. Seldom will the 
proponent for whom the drafter is preparing legislation or a rule have more 
than a rough idea of what it should include, or of its implications. Even less 
likely is that the proponent has considered its detail. 
 
It is also important to note that legislative drafters do not operate in a political 
vacuum. The legislative process and its essential derivative, the drafting 
process, are inherently political in nature. The choices made within such a 
context are inescapably political advocacy choices. Legislative drafters are 
always confronted by the same question and one with obvious ethical and 
political implications, which is, “how much is to be left to the drafter‟s 
discretion?” The answer depends to a considerable extent on how aggressively 
a drafter probes the client for guidance on this question. The drafter who less 
frequently inquires about the client‟s desires will have greater latitude to 
exercise discretion and can accordingly play more of an advocacy role in 
shaping legislation. Such a situation has unfortunate ethical implications, 
tending to undermine two important and related professional responsibilities. 
The unscrupulous drafter who does not explain matters sufficiently to let the 
client make informed decisions not only subverts the ethical obligation to 
consult with clients, but also sidesteps a second duty, to „abide by a client‟s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation‟. The drafters should also 
bear in mind that when they draft laws they should do so within the 
constitutional framework, thus eliminating all bias. 
 
2.3.2.b Leader of the House in the British Parliamentary System 
 
The Leader of the House of Commons is a key figure in both the executive and 
the legislature.  The leader is both a member of Cabinet and a member of 
parliament chosen by the Prime Minister. Although the leader has collective 
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Cabinet responsibility for defending the government‟s policies in the House, he 
or she has the wider task of upholding the rights and interests of the House.  
With the Chief Whip, the Leader is responsible for the arrangement of 
government business in the House of Commons and for planning and supervising 
the effective execution of government‟s legislative programme.  The leader 
chairs the Cabinet committee on the legislative programme. It is here that 
government‟s policy imperatives are discussed in relation to the legislative 
timeframes for passing such legislation.  The leader is the conduit between the 
House of Commons and No 10 Downing Street, which is the headquarters of the 
executive, and communicates all government priorities to the Commons and 
vice versa. 
 
The leader of the House is normally refered to as the „prime-minister‟s man‟ 
ensuring that all government priorities are dealt with swiftly by the Commons. 
The leader has an extensive power base in government through membership of 
some of the most important Cabinet committees, including those on domestic 
affairs, economic affairs, environment, local government, public services, 
international terrorism and European issues.  The leader of the House is 
normally the President of the Privy Council, which advises the Queen on various 
prerogative functions, and deals with the affairs of some 400 bodies. When 
Peter Hain was appointed leader of the House in 2003, he maintained his 
position as Secretary of the State of Wales, also a very powerful position.  The 
participation of the leader in various Cabinet portfolios gives him/her a broad 
perspective of the imperatives of government and the timeframes for 
implementation of certain policy imperatives.  
 
In order to be invited to form a government the prospective Prime Minister 
must have control of the House of Commons, for his or her party to have 
enough of a parliamentary majority to be certain of getting approval for the 
legislative programme, as announced in the Queen‟s Speech, and for 
government taxation and spending, through the Finance Bill and Estimates. The 
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Queen‟s Speech is the parliamentary core of the state ceremony.  The speech 
is drafted by the government and approved by Cabinet. The speech normally 
refers to any recent or forthcoming royal events or state visits, and it contains 
some very broad policy intentions. The 2003 speech began: „My Government 
will maintain its key commitment to economic stability and growth‟, a 
sentence that tells the Commons that they have financial authority, that 
financing the public services will be laid before them. The government‟s day-
to-day control of the Commons is much more extensive. 
 
Perhaps the most evident symptom of that control is the fact that every 
Thursday the Leader of the House announces what the business will be, namely 
what items will be taken on each day for the next fortnight.  The House of 
Commons is primarliy for the government of the day to propose and to dispose. 
The Commons time, which is not ring-fenced, is at the disposal of the 
government of the day.  In the 150 to 160 sitting days in a parliamentary 
session, only twenty (20) days are allocated „opposition‟ days.  Having said 
that, even then it is for the Leader of the House to decide when the 
opposition‟s days will be.  
 
The main thrust of the Queen‟s speech is the legislative programme for the 
coming session, but the bills are usually described in very broad terms, only 
referring to policy imperatives that the government will introduce during that 
year.  
 
In terms of the business of the House nearly 90% is iniated by government and 
is steered through the Commons by the Leader of the House, making 
government business the main thrust of the work of the Commons.  Even 
though government business provides debating opportunity for the opposition 
the extent of the power of initiative is considerable.  The vast majority of 
legislation passed by the legislature is government legislation. Even private 
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members‟ legislation stand almost no chance of enactment unless there is  
government support for it. 
 
The British have an „uncodified constitution‟, in which they are guided by 
conventions and laws that can be changed at any time by the legislature.  In 
Britain the legislature is supreme.  Legislation is not subject to constitutional 
scrutiny, but is guided by conventions instead.  This gives the legislature 
immense power in the legisative process. However, the legislature is mindful of 
the conventions that guide its law-making.  The government of the day has the 
power to change any law or policy to address its election promises.  In this 
regard the Leader of the House is instrumental in ensuring that government‟s 
policy imperatives are achieved in the legislature. 
 
The leader reports to Cabinet on forthcoming parliamentary business.  The 
leader controls the arrangement of business in the House while the programme 
and details are settled by the Government‟s Chief Whip who, in the 
Westminster system, is a member of the Cabinet.  Each week after a 
programme of business has been arranged, the Leader of the House states the 
business for the following week, (and, where possible, for a further week. The 
Leader presents government‟s proposed business to the House, during which 
time any member may ask him/her questions on any topical matter relating to 
either national or international issue or matter of public importance. He or she 
may also move procedural motions relating to the business of the House. This 
event clearly emphasises the control of the government over the way that time 
in the Commons is spent.  In the absence of the Prime Minister, the leader 
moves motions of thanks or congratulation.  The leader advises the House on 
government priorities as they arise. 
The Leader of the House in the Commons, has an office in the Commons. The 
office supports the leader in carrying out the administrative functions relating 
to the legislature in respect of the executive. The location of an executive 
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function in the legislature is strategic in ensuring that government‟s views are 
networked in the Commons. 
 
The conflicts and tensions between the leader as the executive representative 
in the Commons and other political parties seem to be greater when a  
coalition government is in power. This tension is natural as opposition parties 
are generally not supportive of the government‟s position on policy regardless 
of whether it is in the best interests of society. This seems to be the nature of 
opposition politics.   
 
The „usual channels‟ is vague language for the informal discussion that takes 
place between the Leader of the House, the government and the opposition 
chief whips. It includes discussion on day-to-day and minute-to-minute 
conversations and arrangements between whips on both sides.  A key player is 
the private secretary to the government Chief Whip, who, although a civil 
servant and under the Chief Whips‟ direction, plays a highly political role as a 
go-between.  
 
The usual channels deal with a wide range of business, from issues such as the 
amount of time the Commons will spend processing legislation in committee. 
Discussions through the usual channels are private. Were they to be made 
public, the effect is very likely to be less effective. 
 
In the UK system, it might appear that little stands in the way of the 
government doing precisely what it wants, but the reality is a little more subtle 
than that.  There is an expectation that the government, having won a 
mandate in an election, with a majority in the Commons can get its business 
through the House.  However, in pratice this depends on a number of factors. 
These are, firstly, that the government must ensure that it has the support of 
its back benchers in order to maintain its majority in the Commons.  The 
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government also ensures that it keeps the media opinion benign (Rogers & 
Walters :2004:84). 
 
The government‟s working relationship with opposition parties ensures that 
government‟s legislative priorities are met. In House terms this means that 
there is general agreement on the arrangement and timing of business. An 
effective working relationship on the part of the opposition means that the 
opposition will have a chance to lodge priorities for debate.  
 
INTERVIEWS 
 
In an interview with a clerk in the House of Commons (March 2004) , he stated 
that,  „since 1997, the work of the modernisation committee led to the 
programme arrangements having been fine-tuned. In the early days of 
programming, the system operated on a fairly consensual basis, even when 
applied to very controverisal bills as the devolution measures, but from 2000 
onwards programming had  increasingly become a matter of contention, indeed 
bitter contention, between the two sides in the Commons.‟ In a debate in 
2001, Eric Forth, the then shadow leader of the House, said: „The government 
seemed determined to minimise or dispose of all opportunities for proper 
scrutiny of legislation‟, and in April 2003, he referred in the House to the 
„systematic, routine and vicious timetabling of bills‟, while former Chancellor 
Kenneth Clark discribed programming as „pernicious.‟ (Rogers and Walters: 
2004:180) 
 
There are various reasons why programming of bills is a source of strong 
disagreement in the Commons.  The modernisation committee recommended 
that the constraints on time should be balanced by the more effective means 
of scrutiny of legislation, and that this could be done through the use of special 
standing committees. However, In the four sessions between 1998 and 2002, 
there were 48 programme motions, but only one bill was sent to the special 
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standing committees. This illustrates that although procedures and rules exist 
they could be tweaked without committing any violation to ensure a favourable 
outcome for the government. 
 
In the UK experience, as mentioned earlier, a certain amount of time is 
allotted to some business proceedings in terms of the rules and conventions of 
that House. Although programming offers the prospect of more effective use of 
time, it can do nothing to increase the total time available, the pressure of 
government‟s legislative programme on the legislature remains the same.  
Government‟s legislative priortities remain the main focus of the House of 
Commons. 
2.3.3. The South African Approach 
 
2.3.3.a (i) Pre -1993  
 
The discussion highlights that during the period 1910 -1993, the South African 
government was characterised predominantly by the dominance of a fused 
executive and legislature in a parliamentary system of government in which 
parliament was supreme. (Labuschagne: 2004: 84). In essence, the 
constitutional arrangement which was in effect at the time of parliamentary 
sovereignty10 deliberately inhibited the separation of powers between the 
three arms of government so that the state could pass and enforce its 
Apartheid policies and programmes. The period 1910 -1993 was marked by the 
dominance of legislative supremacy in the parliamentary system of 
government. The impact of legislative dominance on the separation of powers 
was compounded by the fact that the legislature was sovereign and 
unrestrained in its unlimited power to pass legislation (Devenish: 1998: 8). This 
over-concentration of power in the legislature prevented the judiciary from 
exercising review of the laws passed by Parliament. The courts could only 
                                                 
10
 Parliamentary sovereignty refers to the absolute and unlimited authority of the legislature. 
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interpret the statutes and not question their validity. However, this 
constitutional arrangement, including the Apartheid state, changed profoundly 
after the adoption of South Africa‟s interim Constitution in 1993 and the 
subsequent democratic Constitution in 1996. 
 
South Africa has come a long way from a system based on „Parliamentary 
Sovereignty‟ under the Apartheid dispensation to one based on the principle of 
Constitutional Supremacy. The Constitution is the supreme law and even the 
legislature and the executive, including the President, must abide by and 
uphold the values enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
The National Assembly11 is elected to represent the people and to ensure 
government by the people in terms of the Constitution. It does so by electing 
the President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, 
by passing legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action. The 
NCOP, on the other hand, represents the provincial interests at a national 
level.12 
 
2.3.3.a (ii) Post-apartheid 
 
Constitutional Principle V1, of the constitutional principles negotiated at the 
multi-party negotiating process in the early 1990s and annexed to the interim 
Constitution, provided that: 
 
“There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and the judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances 
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.” 
 
When certifying the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court had to consider 
whether the new Constitution did indeed comply with this principle of 
                                                 
11
 Constitution Section 42 (3) 
12
 Constitution, Section 42(4) 
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separation of powers indicated above. In responding to some of the challenges 
raised in respect to the text of the Constitution, the court responded as 
follows: 
 
“There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers, 
and in a democratic system of government in which checks and 
balances result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of 
government upon another, there is no separation that is absolute.  
While in the USA, France and the Netherlands members of the 
executive may not continue to be members of the legislature, this 
is not a requirement of the German system of separation of 
powers. Moreover, because of the different systems of checks and 
balances that exist in these countries, the relationship between 
the different branches of government and the power or influence 
that one branch of government has over the other, differs from 
one country to another.” 
 
And- 
 
“The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, 
recognises the functional independence of branches of 
government. On the other hand, the principle of checks and 
balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the 
constitutional order, as a totality, prevents the branches of 
government from usurping power from one another. In this sense 
it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch 
on the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a 
complete separation of powers: the scheme is always one of 
partial separation.”  
 
In Justice Frankfurter‟s words, “the areas are partly interacting, not wholly 
disjointed” (Constitutional Court Judgement: 1996). The court held that the 
Constitution did in fact comply with Constitutional Principle V1 in recognising 
both a separation of powers and “appropriate checks and balances” between 
the three branches of government to “ensure accountability, responsiveness 
and openness” (O Regan: 2005: 2).  
Although the doctrine of the separation of powers allows for the three 
branches of government to have separate and distinct primary roles and 
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functions, they have shared roles and functions at the same time. They are 
interrelated and interdependent. This applies to representation, law-making, 
oversight and accountability, policy-making and dispute resolution (Gutto: 
2007: 6). In relation to this, Rautenbach & Malherbe (1996: 69) observe that so 
much overlap of power exists that the Westminster Parliamentary System is 
described in terms of partial separation of powers. The practice that has 
developed in South Africa with regard to the relationship between the 
legislature and the executive gives credence to this theory. The Constitutional 
Court further noted that: “No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete 
separation of powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation” (1996:10 
BCLR 1253 (cc) para 109.). With regard to the certification of the Constitution, 
Rautenbach & Malherbe (1996: 69) further highlight that “no system exists in 
which a total and absolute separation of government authority can be found.” 
 
The diagram below illustrates the structures and functioning of the three 
pillars of government within the three spheres of government. 
 
FIGURE 3: Structure and function of the South African Government 
 
Source: http://www.jyu.fi/viesti/verkkotuotanto/kp/sa/soc_government.shtml  
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Legislative drafting is essentially the domain of the executive. Each 
department has a legal department tasked with the responsibility to develop 
and draft bills in accordance with government‟s policy imperatives.  
 
In terms of the Constitution the executive develops the laws and policies for 
the country, the legislature passes the laws but also has the power to initiate 
laws. Similarly, Section 85(2)(d) of the Constitution empowers the courts to 
develop common law and customary law, i.e. Sections 8 and 39, which implies 
that the courts also have the power to make laws, apart from interpreting and 
applying the law. In its legislative and oversight role the legislature also 
contributes to policy evolution, which is normally considered to be the domain 
of the executive. Since 1994, only one Private Member‟s Bill of substance was 
passed by Parliament, that is the Correctional Services Amendment Bill, 1996, 
proposed by Mr Carl Niehaus, an ANC MP. The National Assembly also pioneered 
the Floor-crossing legislation (2000) and drafted the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure Act (2008), in line with constitutional provisions.  
It is important to note that the National Assembly plays the important role of 
electing the President, the Head of State, from amongst its members. The 
Chief Justice presides over the proceedings of the election of both the Speaker 
and the President. It is on this occasion that all three arms of government 
participate in the proceedings of the National Assembly. (National Assembly 
Minutes: 6 May 2009). In this case it signifies that although they are separate 
arms of government, they co-operate on formal occassions to make decisions. 
Once elected, the President then relinquishes his/her seat in Parliament and 
selects his Cabinet13, also from amongst Members of Parliament. The 
Constitution provides that the President can select two Ministers and two 
Deputy Ministers who are not Members of Parliament.  
 
                                                 
13
 Cabinet: A group of senior Ministers that meets formally and regularly, and is chaired by the 
President/Prime-Minster. Deputy Ministers are not members of Cabinet. 
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Importantly, Gutto (2007: 6) observes that the Head of State, Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers are also elected representatives of the people. Thus, the 
separation of powers needs to be understood as co-existing with power-sharing, 
more especially between the legislature and the executive. The balance of 
power between the branches could be a matter of concern within the South 
African context. From a Constitutional angle, the executive could be viewed to 
hold the balance of power simply because the executive is constituted by the 
Head of State, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and 
the symbol of a sovereign nation in the international community (Gutto:2007: 
6). Cabinet is the political executive of government and has a more direct role 
in the regulation of the economy, including the generation of the revenue that 
all the other branches depend on.  
 
Theoretically, the power that the legislature has to amend the budget may 
seem to tip the balance of power in its favour. The Money Bills Amendment 
Procedures Act allows for processes and steps to be followed by the relevant 
Portfolio Committees in the recommendation process before any amendments 
to a money bill can be agreed to. The extent to which the legislature 
effectively fulfils its role in passing legislation lies in the power relations 
between the both the legislature and executive. This balance of power is 
dynamic and can shift either way depending on the political will in both the 
legislature and the executive (Gutto: 2007: 6). 
 
2.3.3.b Leader of Government Business (LOGB) in South Africa 
 
Similarly to the UK System, South Africa also has a „leader‟( see Chapter 3). 
Consistent with the Constitution Section (91) 4, the President appoints the 
Leader of Government Business (LOGB)14 in the National Assembly when 
                                                 
14
 The Leader of Government Business (LOGB) is appointed by the President. The key responsibility of the 
Leader is to ensure that government’s legislative programme is prioritised by Parliament. The Leader’s 
office forms the conduit between the executive and the legislature. Although the leader is an executive 
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appointing Cabinet. The „leader‟ is in the service of the executive. This 
position was held by senior Cabinet Ministers in the past, Trevor Manuel was 
appointed as the first Leader of the House in 1994, until 1995, when he was 
succceeded by Steve Tshwete, while the name of the office changed to the 
Leader of Government Business in 1996. Jacob Zuma was appointed to this 
positon in 1999. The leader is required to speak on government‟s behalf on a 
range of issues. “The constructive manner in which Jacob Zuma and, under his 
leadership, Parliament began to benefit from a structured relationship with 
the executive. The way Jacob Zuma conducted this relationship earned him 
the accolade „friend to parliament” (SA Parliament since 1994:41). 
 
The primary role of the LOGB, as developed over time, is being the interface 
between the executive and the legislature.  The Leader provides strategic 
political input effectively to programme government priorities, while 
considering the legislature‟s constitutional role in processing legislation, with 
regard to public involvement. That being said, the LOGB is responsible for 
approaching the legislature to hasten the legislative process at any stage of a 
bill as is required by government, which is called fast-tracking.  Since 1994, the 
LOGB has played a significant role in ensuring that executive priorities are 
responded to by the legislature.  
 
The interface between the two branches is necessary to promote and 
strengthen accountability and effective exercise of oversight of the executive. 
The dynamic interaction between opposition Members of Parliament and 
members of the executive in the National Assembly is facilitated in a manner 
that promotes transparency and robust debate. 
 
The legislature has the responsibility to pass legislation and to oversee its 
implementation. Included in this is the function of approving the Budget, or 
                                                                                                                                                 
appointment, he/she through his/her parliamentary office has a strong presence in parliament, ensuring that 
government priorities are given precedence in the legislature. 
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Main Appropriation Bill, which includes the Budget Votes of individual 
departments. The LOGB plays an instrumental role in ensuring the scheduling 
of bills and Budget Votes in accordance with government‟s priorities, whilst 
considering Parliament‟s programme timeframes. Much of the LOGB‟s influence 
is exerted behind the scenes through discussions with the Chief Whip and 
chairpersons of committees.   
 
The above is practically illustrated through the Interaction with other political 
parties, for example, with a view to developing and enhancing co-operation, 
the LOGB has quarterly meetings with all party leaders to build and maintain 
good relations between all parties and party leaders. The LOGB briefs party 
leaders on various policy issues and government initiatives. Parties may raise 
issues of importance that they may feel the government should address.  
 
The Chief Whips‟ Forum, which comprises of whips and senior party 
representatives of all parties, is a communication facilitation forum for parties. 
This Forum meets weekly to discuss, among other things, programme matters 
and to ensure the smooth operation of Parliament in relation to problems 
experienced by members. If there are issues that the Chief Whips‟ Forum 
cannot resolve and it requires government intervention, then such issues are 
raised with the LOGB at a separate meeting. 
 
Over the years the LOGB has forged good relations between all parties, which 
has generated a positive response from parties in accommodating requests 
from government relating to programming matters. All parties are kept abreast 
of matters relating to the parliamentary programme, for example, parties are 
informed timeously of the availability of Ministers on Question day in the 
Assembly.  
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2.4. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the doctrine and philosophy of 
separation of powers. It was pointed out that the separation of powers among 
the different spheres of government is probably one of the oldest constitutional 
principles in politics. It is a generally accepted principle that the fundamental 
value of the separation of powers lies in its constitutional „checks and 
balances‟ to ensure that state authority is constitutionally controlled and 
regulated so as to ensure that it is not exercised arbitrarily. In essence, the 
doctrine of separation of powers entails that the freedom enjoyed by citizens 
of the state can be ensured only through a division of central institutionalised 
power. There were many scholars who contributed to the body of knowledge on 
separation of powers, but notable among these were the philosophers John 
Locke and Baron de Montesquieu. Although they are not credited with 
developing the concept, they did add considerably to the debate at the time 
and are even credited with its further development. 
 
The chapter also focused on the different approaches to separation of powers, 
reviewing the American Presidential system, the Westminster of Parliamentary 
system and the South African systems, as experienced prior to 1993 to the 
present. In the American system there is a clear distinction between the 
executive and the legislature, which is Congress. The President appoints 
Cabinet Secretaries, who are not members of Congress, although their 
appointment may require the advice and consent of a congressional committee. 
The President has important legislative powers and also has power to veto 
legislation passed by Congress. The President and his Ministers are accountable 
to the electorate. 
 
Unlike the American Presidential system, the Westminster system is a „fusion of 
powers‟ between the legislative and executive branches. In the latter system, 
the Prime Minister and his/her Cabinet Ministers are part of the legislature. 
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The executive dictates the legislative agenda, and individual members have 
little political power to introduce their own legislative initiatives. 
Parliamentary systems, more especially in developed countries, are 
characterised by parties that are highly structured and tend toward unified 
action, bloc voting and distinct party platforms. Strict party discipline is 
required in parliamentary systems primarily because deviation from the party 
line could result in bringing down the government. 
 
With regard to the South African experience, the discussion highlighted that 
during the period 1910-1993, the South African government was characterised 
predominately by the dominance of a fused executive and legislature in a 
parliamentary system of government in which Parliament was supreme. In 
essence the constitutional arrangement which prevailed at the time inhibited 
the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the judiciary. 
However, with the demise of Apartheid and the adoption of the final 
Constitution in 1996, the constitutional landscape changed dramatically.  
 
In South Africa Members of Parliament are not directly accountable to their 
constituencies; they are accountable to their party. South Africa‟s party-
dominant electoral system plays a major role in direct accountability to the 
party at the expense of the electorate.  
 
The constitution-drafters in democratic South Africa recognised and entrenched 
the principles of separation of powers and made provision for the appropriate 
checks and balances between the three arms of government to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. The separation of powers that 
exists between the executive and the legislature in South Africa is not as clear-
cut as that which theoretically exists in the American Presidential system. In 
the United States Cabinet Secretaries are not members of Congress, as in 
parliamentary systems, therefore creating the perception of complete 
separation (Verney 1992:115). This clear separation between the executive and 
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the legislature does not imply that legislative oversight and executive 
accountablity are more effective.  
 
It is widely accepted that there is no universally accepted system for achieving 
the separation of powers between the different branches of government. In 
practice, the three branches have separate and distinct roles and functions, 
but they also have shared roles and functions. Herein seems to lie the problem, 
because some commentators argue that the balance of power is tilted in favour 
of the executive. 
 
The chapter is rounded off with the discussions of the role and functions of the 
Leader of Government Business (LOGB) in South Africa. The office is not unique 
to South Africa, but has evolved over the years and has acquired unique 
attributes. The theory of the South African approach constitutes the model 
that is to be used to analyse Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
27 April 1994 marked the beginning of a new era in South African law-making. 
The first term of the new Parliament, 1994 - 1999, is significant in that both 
the executive and the legislature had the enormous task of rewriting statutes 
dominated by oppressive apartheid laws.  
 
Parliament is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the 
people in terms of the Constitution, the electorate thus „handing over‟ its 
power to Members of Parliament. Parliament represents the people through its 
public consultation process in processing legislation. The legislature must, 
among other things, ensure that democracy is strengthened by passing 
legislation in a democratic process. In this regard, public participation in the 
legislative process is an important factor that contributes to strengthening 
democracy. 
 
This chapter uses, firstly, the process of passing legislation and, secondly, the 
process of oversight to examine the separation of powers and the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature. In so doing it highlights and 
examines the role played by the Leader of Government Business (LOGB).  
 
The chapter outlines the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature as it plays out with regard to the legislative process showing more 
examples of harmony than of discord. The chapter is organised in five sections. 
Section one introduces the chapter. Section two provides an overview of the 
process of passing legislation. Section three provides an overview of the laws 
that were passed. Section four discusses the oversight process and section five 
summarises the chapter.  
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3.2. OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATION PASSED  
 
Parliament has had an extraordinary legislative load since its establishment in 
1994. The table below illustrates the number of bills15 that Parliament has 
passed since 1994. Many discriminatory Apartheid laws have been either 
amended or abolished. It was no surprise therefore that a total of 998 new laws 
were enacted during the first nine years of democracy in South Africa. 
 
FIGURE 4: Number of bills passed (1994-2010) 
 
Year Bills Acts  
1994 60 55 
1995 108 89 
1996 108 108 
1997 116 108 
1998 142 137 
1999 66 60 
2000 70 70 
2001 85 69 
2002 70 75 
2003 74 61 
2004 25 40 
2005 42 39 
2006 35 28 
2007 51 45 
2008 82 77 
2009 8 16 
2009 (4thparliament) 16 8 
2010 47 26 
Source: Legislation and Bills Office in Parliament: December: 2010 
 
                                                 
15 Bills: proposed legislation in the form of a draft statute; if passed, a bill becomes an act 
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The overwhelming majority of the laws are passed without incident, which 
demonstrates the balance of power and synergies between the executive and 
the legislature. Determining the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature, the way it ultimately plays out in the legislative process is a 
consequence of the party-dominant system.  
 
There are however some instances when the process of passing legislation is 
less harmonious. It is these incidences that allow us an opportunity more 
closely to examine the relationship between the executive and the legislature 
and illustrate perhaps more clearly the principle of the separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature in a democracy.  
 
3.3. THE RELATIONSHIP DEFINED BY THE CONSTITUTION  
 
The Constitution provides the framework in which the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature16 is played out with regard to the legislative 
process. In this regard the Constitution places an obligation on the National 
Assembly (Section 55(2)) to provide for mechanisms through which the National 
Assembly ensures oversight. These mechanisms are the executive being 
summoned to appear before portfolio and select committees, the questions 
procedure, parliamentary debates, statements by members and ministerial 
responses. Section 42 of the Constitution ensures that both the National 
Assembly and the NCOP are national forums for public17 consideration of issues.  
 
The importance of the Constitution and the legislature is perhaps best summed 
up by former President Nelson Mandela‟s final speech to the National Assembly 
in 1999 
“Because the people of South Africa finally chose a profoundly 
legal path to their revolution, those who frame and enact the 
                                                 
 
17
 Public Participation Process:  Constitution provides that Parliament must engage the 
public by holding public hearings on legislation. 
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constitution and law are in the vanguard of the fight for change. It 
is in the legislature that the instruments have been fashioned to 
create a better life for all.  It is here that oversight of government 
has been exercised. It is here that our society with all its 
formations has had an opportunity to influence policy and its 
implementation.” (Hansard: 26 March 1999) 
 
Parliament‟s rules provide substantive powers to its committees, through which 
it may summon any person, including a member of the executive. This similar 
provision is also provided by the Constitution with regard to the NCOP (Section 
66(2)) who may require a member of the executive to attend a meeting of the 
Council or a committee of the Council. In this regard the Constitution forms the 
framework for the relationship between the executive and the legislature.  
 
The Executive, meaning the Deputy President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, 
holds 65 seats in the National Assembly. They are key drivers of national policy 
and are responsible for the lion‟s share of the work generated in the National 
Assembly. This mainly relates to Bills introduced by the Executive and various 
reports, policy papers and strategy documents whose passage through 
Parliament is facailitated by the LOGB (NA Guide to Procedure 2004: 135). The 
Leader of Government Business plays a key role in co-ordinating government‟s 
legislative programme, which must take place within the required deadlines18 
set by Parliament and, where necessary, requests Parliament to “fast-track19” 
a bill.  
 
As described in chapter two, although the Constitution does allow Parliament 
the power to iniate bills (55,1(b)), the South African Parliament has not often 
utilised this mechanism to iniate major policy changes. One such example is in 
the case of the floor-crossing legislation (2000). This practise is historical in 
                                                 
18
 Deadlines for submission of legislation: For each quarter the Joint Programme Committee (JPC) 
determines deadlines for the introduction for legislation by the Executive.  
19
 Fast-Tracking is a process whereby a Joint or House rule or rules are dispensed with in order to expedite 
the prompt passage of an urgent bill through Parliament.  A request for fast-tracking may only be made by 
the Leader of Government Business, in the case of a bill initiated by the Executive. 
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nature as most legislatures in parliamentary systems have limited responsibility 
for drafting legislation, except in the case of the German Parliament as 
described in chapter 2.  
 
To deal with the work generated by the executive, the legislature established 
54 Committees that are all chaired by ANC Members, with the exception of the 
Public Accounts Committee. It is an international convention in democratic 
states, also confirmed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, of which the South 
African Parliament is a member, that committees overseeing government 
expenditure is chaired by an opposition party member. In following this 
convention, Mr Themba Godi of the African People‟s Convention has been 
appointed to the chairpersonship of the Committee. 
 
Although the decision-making power is „handed over‟ to Members of 
Parliament, consultation with the electorate plays an important role in the 
democratic legislative process. Public Participation in the legislative process is 
an important constitutional imperative to ensure that the views of all interest 
groups are considered so that democracy is strengthened. Political parties are 
the main vehicle for representing different interest groups, which is due to the 
electoral system in South Africa, in terms of which voters cast their votes for 
parties of their choice rather than for individual Members of Parliament. 
 
The legislature has the responsibility to ensure that the legislation is fully 
debated in an open public forum. The legislative process involves several 
categories20 of bills, each of whom is subject to a different procedure. 
                                                 
20
 Section 74: Constitutional Amendments: Amending the Bill of Rights requires a vote of two-thirds of 
the National Assembly and the support of six provinces in the National Council. Amendments must be 
passed by the NCOP. All amendments affecting the provinces must be passed by both Houses. Section 75: 
Ordinary Bills not affecting provinces: These Bills can only be introduced in the National Assembly and 
once it is passed it is sent to the NCOP. A Bill is passed when there is a majority vote by delegates of the 
NCOP present. Section 76:  Ordinary Bills that affect provinces The Bills are introduced in either the 
NA or NCOP and must be considered by both Houses. Votes are made by provincial delegations and for 
this reason there are nine votes. Bills are usually considered by a provincial committee, which may hold 
public hearings on the bill for comments and suggestions. And Section 77: Money Bills (budget, taxes, 
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3.3.1. The Pre-Parliamentary Legislative Process 
 
The original ideas for government legislation come from various sources. 
Party policy is derived from Luthuli House, the headquarters of the ANC, which 
is approved through maintaining the mandate of the elections. Apart from the 
policy being tested by the ANC it is also tested in general elections, where the 
ANC gets its mandate. 
 
 Politics shapes laws, economics and society in many ways, for example, 
as Johnson (2000:147) articulates, “reform is mainly driven by the 
executive”.The party system is mainly influenced by the policies and 
mandates of the majority party. Policy may also arise from submissions by and 
pressure from interested citizens, parties and groups in the community or 
from suggestions by Members of Parliament. 
 
Bills are drafted by departmental officials, although often experts are 
contracted to assist in the drafting of specific Bills. According to Parliament‟s 
Training Manual (2009)21 Cabinet22 is involved in the legislative process not 
only by initiating legislation but also at its conclusion since the bill only 
becomes an Act of Parliament and therefore binding law in the Republic once 
it has been assented to by the President. The President may only return a bill 
to Parliament for reconsideration on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The 
Leader of Government Business (LOGB) informs Parliament at the beginning of 
each year of government‟s legislative priorities. The intention is to allow 
Portfolio and Select Committees to plan its work for the year ahead. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
levies or duties) Money Bills allocate public money for a particular purpose or imposes taxes, levies and 
duties. They can only be introduced by the Minister of Finance in the National Assembly. In terms of the 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009 (Act No 9 of 2009), Parliament has the 
power to amend money bills. 
21
 Parliamentary Training Manual 2009: Guide produced for new Members of Parliament. 
22
 Deputy Ministers are not Members of Cabinet – Section 91(1) 
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3.3.2. Green and White Paper Process 
 
The Green and White Paper process is a public consultation process whereby 
government23 consults with various stakeholders during the drafting stage of a 
bill. This often includes consultation with various communities that are 
affected by the proposed legislation as well as NEDLAC24, where proposed 
legislation relating to labour market policy is fleshed out before it is introduced 
in Parliament, and where all significant changes to social and economic policy 
are considered. 
 
This discussion document gives an idea of the general thinking that informs a 
particular policy. It is then published in the Government Gazette for comment, 
suggestions or ideas. This leads to the development of a more refined 
discussion document, a White Paper, which is a broad statement on 
government policy.25 The White Paper is again published for public comment in 
the Government Gazette, if any further comments are received they are 
considered. The White Paper is further refined into a draft bill. 
 
Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe, at the 15th NEDLAC Annual Summit 11 
September 2010, articulated the importance of the relationship between 
government and labour in ensuring that legislation takes into account issues 
that affect workers‟ rights: 
 
“Whilst this consultative forum demonstrates a commitment by 
government towards recognising consultation with all sectors in 
legislative development, by the late 1990‟s, however, labour 
began to complain that government and business were not taking 
Nedlac seriously enough and that they saw Nedlac as a compliance 
requirement, rather than an integral part of a state committed to 
a social partnership path to economic development.” 
 
                                                 
23
 Government also refers to the Executive 
24
 National Economic Development and Labour Council 
25
 Training Manual for Members of Parliament 
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3.3.3. Cabinet Process 
 
The Minister in charge of the bill submits the draft bill together with an 
explanatory memorandum to the Cabinet Committee for comment. 
Subsequent to recommendations by the committee, further drafting may 
occur. Liaison between the Cabinet Committee and the relevant State 
Department often takes place before that committee takes a decision on the 
bill. The recommendations of the Cabinet Committee are submitted to the 
full Cabinet, chaired by the President. After Cabinet has given its 
approval26, which may include further recommendations, the bill is published 
for public comment in the Government Gazette (NA Rule 241)27. Immediatley 
after receiving Cabinet approval, it is important to note that the Bill is 
published for public comment three times by the executive before it is 
introduced in Parliament. The Minister in charge of the bill informs 
Parliament of the proposed legislation to comply with Joint Rule 15928. 
 
The LOGB informs the respective department to refer the Bill to the State 
Law Advisors (SLA) who finalise its drafting and check that it does not 
conflict with existing laws, including the Constitution. After the SLAs have 
certified the Bill it is referred to Parliament. The LOGB informs Parliament 
of its urgency or importance as soon as the bill is certified. The same 
applies to normal procedural statutes that do not require implementation 
by a required date. 
 
The state law advisors transfer the certified bill to Parliament. The Bill is 
edited for language, printed and given a Bill number, B4-2011, for example. 
The Bill is referred to the relevant Portfolio Committee by the Speaker.  
 
                                                 
26
 Bills to be introduced by a member of the executive must be approved by Cabinet, as Cabinet is 
‘collectively’ accountable in terms of the Constitution. 
27
 NA Rule 241Bills must be published in the Government Gazette after receiving cabinet approval. 
28
 Joint Rule 159:After Cabinet approval parliament must receive the draft bill and an explanatory 
memorandum before certification 
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3.3.4. Parliamentary Committee Process 
 
Committees are the main platform where the legislature engages with 
legislation or any matter introduced by the executive. Committees are often 
referred to as the „engine room‟ of the legislature. It is here that civil society 
is given an opportunity to express its views and may try to influence the 
outcome of legislation. At the beginning of the parliamentary process the 
respective committee to which the bill is referred engages with state 
departmental officials, who go through each clause of the Bill, keeping in mind 
the imperatives and implications that the bill will have on society once 
implemented. Committees represent all political parties; this is the stage 
where everyone is given a voice. Committees play a very important role in 
processing legislation and overseeing the work of the executive. The 
committee must ensure public participation before approving the Bill as 
provided for by the Constitution. The committee must advertise in various 
media sources for comment from the public. Public hearings are normally 
conducted at Parliament, but in cases where rural communities are consulted, 
the hearings are held in that area to make the process accessible to the public.  
 
There is uaually a formal closure of the public participation process, however, 
nothing prevents a committee from receiving and distributing further written 
representations until the voting stage in the committee. After the Adoption of 
Motion of Desirability, the motion to accept the principle of and the need for 
the legislation, the committee considers the bill formally. Each clause is 
formally put, and every amendment formally proposed, and decided. The 
committee then formally considers and adopts the report, recommending 
passing or rejecting of the Bill (Parliamentary Training Manual: 2009).  
 
Depending on the nature of the Bill, this process of engaging the public could 
be quite extensive and could have an influence on the outcome of a bill. The 
„Protection of Information Bill‟ has changed as a result of the public‟s 
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interaction with the legislature on a bill initiated by the executive. The name 
of the bill was also changed to the „Protection of State Information‟. Due to 
the huge public opposition to the bill, the majority party, the ANC, 
subsequently reopened the public consultation process to consider further 
issues raised by various stakeholders, although parliament had already finalised 
its process of deliberation. The ad hoc committee dealing with the bill had 
voted, or reported, on the bill on 13 September 2011, thus formally closing 
proceedings on the bill. In terms of parliamentary procedure this means that 
the bill is no longer in the committee arena, but already before the National 
Assembly for consideration.  
 
This example highlights the fact that the legislative process can potentially be 
relegated to „rubber stamping‟. The executive managed to influence the 
committee to proceed with passing the bill despite huge public and civil society 
opposition to the legislation. Some Constituional Court judges had declared the 
legislation unconstituional before it was passed. Despite the parliamentary 
procedures being followed, including a public participation process on the bill, 
the legislature had not considered any of the concerns raised by civil society. In 
this case civil society had continously exerted pressure on Parliament to ensure 
assertiveness in the legislative process. In theory the legislative processes were 
followed, but the public‟s dissatisfaction with and objection to the bill were 
not considered. On 20 September 2011, The Protection of State Information Bill 
was removed from the „Order Paper‟ by the ANC Parliamentary Caucus until 
further consultation with civil society had taken place. Civil society had been 
instrumental in ensuring parliamentary dominance over the executive in this 
regard.  
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Act 
Goes to 
President for 
assent 
Transmitted to the other 
House for concurrence 
Submitted to a sitting of the House for 
further debate before a vote is taken 
 
Debated in the Committee and amended if 
necessary 
Referred to relevant committee and published in Government 
Gazette for public comment 
A Bill is introduced in the National Assembly (NA) or the National Council 
of Provinces (NCOP) and tagged by the Presiding Officers 
FIGURE 5: Legislative process after introduction of the bill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Source: Paper presented at a Parliamentary Monitoring Group Training Workshop, 
Mandy Taylor 1998, How a bill becomes law. 
 
To facilitate government‟s legislative programme through Parliament, the 
office of the Leader of Government Business was established in 1995, and is 
located in Parliament. The office has a dual accountablity, with the staff  
accountable to the Leader for line-function responsiblities, ensuring that 
government priorities are met, and they are accountable to Parliament 
administratively, for managing the budget, managing leave, and reporting. 
 
3.4. THE ROLE OF THE LEADER OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS  
 
The Joint Rules outline the responsibilities of the Leader of Government 
Business in Parliament (Parliament RSA, Joint Rule 150). This administrative 
interface between the executive and the legislature has been developed over 
Assent is when the President 
signs a Bill to make it an Act of 
Parliament - Law of the Land 
If agreed to by other House, sent to 
President for assent; if not agreed, 
sent back to first House. 
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time since 1994, and is continually evolving. The LOGB is an executive 
function, and it also has an administrative function based in Parliament.  
 
The responsiblities of the LOGB include:  
 taking charge of the affairs of the National Executive in Parliament;  
 the programming of Parliamentary business initiated by the National 
Executive, within the time allocated for that purpose;  
 arranging the attendance of Cabinet, as appropriate, in respect of 
parliamentary business generally; and  
 performing any other function provided for by a Joint Rule or a 
resolution of the Assembly or the Council, or Resolutions adopted in both 
Houses.  
 
3.4.1. The role and functions of the Leader of Government Business 
 
The administrative liaison function between the executive and the legislature 
in supporting the role has been developed over time. The office of the Leader 
mainly fulfills its role by monitoring the legislative programmes of the different 
Ministries and by ensuring that the flow of legislation is a smooth one. The 
related function is to provide strategic political input so as to effectively 
programme government priorities, while considering parliament‟s 
constitutional role in processing legislation. The LOGB is thus responsible for 
approaching Parliament to hasten the legislative process at any stage for any 
bill as is required by Government, which is also called fast-tracking, in terms 
of. Joint Rule 216 (1)(a)29. 
 
The office in Parliament is strategically placed and has well-established links 
with Ministries, the Chief Whip of the ANC, Chairpersons of Committees in 
                                                 
29, The Leader of Government Business makes a request for the fast-tracking of a Bill.. 
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Parliament, the Speaker‟s Office and all parliamentary functionaries in the 
„procedural family‟. 
 
 The LOGB determines which legislation is forthcoming for a specific term 
of Parliament and its urgency and, where necessary, fast-tracking of a 
bill; 
 facilitates the passage of all draft legislation through its various stages, 
from State Departments through State Law Advisors into Parliament; 
 deals with bottlenecks in the legislative process to ensure that 
government priorities are met - appropriately raising and 
communicating issues with Ministers, State Officials, State Law Advisors, 
Portfolio Committee Chairpersons, the ANC Caucus, etc. 
 monitors the progress of legislation within the Committee phase and 
taking the necessary action to facilitate progress; and 
 liaises with Committee Chairpersons regarding government priorities,  
ensuring the political prioritisation of legislation. 
 
It is evident that throughout the parliamentary processes the Leader of 
Government Business, through the office in Parliament, plays a significant role 
in ensuring that government‟s legislative priorities are met. 
 
The office has now developed into one that performs a dual function, 
supporting both the executive and the legislature. Parliament relies more and 
more on this office with regard to the functions of programming, availability of 
the executive, tracking matters of executive compliance and tracking 
vacancies in institutions that support democracy.  
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3.4.2. Political management of the parliamentary programme 
 
During the period 1994 to 1999 the parliamentary programme was a purely 
political function and was accommodated in the Office of the Leader of 
Government Business (LOGB), which provided support to the ANC in developing 
the parliamentary programme. By 1997 this function was removed from the 
political management and brought largely under the management of the 
National Assembly Table (NA), which reports directly to the Speaker. In this 
regard a Programming Office and a Technical Committee were established 
under auspices of the National Assembly Table. This location has largely proven 
problematic as there is no central point of co-ordination linking the political 
imperatives and objectives of the programme to those of administration.  
 
INTERVIEWS 
 
In interviews conducted at Parliament, a Senior MP (Interview A) stated that 
“The change in the location of the programming function was largely due to 
the personality and power of Speaker Ginwala, as she wanted to have control 
over every aspect of parliamentary work; this gave her power over what was 
happening in the institution.” Another senior MP (Interview B) argued that 
“The negative that resulted from this was that programming has become a 
mechanical process where slots are being looked for to insert programmes and 
bills without regard for the political impact and influence it has both in- and 
outside of the institution. In some instances this manner of programming 
results in unnecessary embarrassment and difficulties for the executive and 
the majority party in parliament.” Furthermore, another MP (Interview C) 
argued: “That which is largely a political process in which political 
management was intended to direct the parliamentary programme in 
accordance with the mandate of the majority party has now fallen into the 
hands of bureaucrats and administrative functionaries who may not always 
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have the sensitivities generated in closed political discussions and meetings of 
the majority party.” 
 
3.4.3. ‘Fast-tracking’ Legislation  
 
Fast-tracking is a process whereby a Joint or House Rule or Rules are dispensed 
with in order to expedite the prompt passage of an urgent bill through 
Parliament (National Assembly Guide: 2004:145). The Leader of Government 
Business chairs the parliamentary sub-committee of the Joint Programme 
Committee, which considers requests from the executive to fast-track a bill. 
The LOGB presents to parliament a „political motivation‟ for legislation to be 
approved by Parliament within a specific period of time. Often these requests 
centre around financial implications for government.  
 
The decision to fast-track30 can only be made by the sub-committee of the 
Joint Programme Committee (JPC) when both the Speaker and the Chairperson 
of the Council are present. The decision must be ratified by both Houses on the 
first sitting day after the decision, National Assembly Guide (2004: 147). 
Consideration must then be given to the four-week legislative cycle31 of the 
Council, which is required in order to inform the provincial legislatures and 
obtain voting mandates. 
 
In all cases of „fast-tracking‟, the Bills were passed without any opposition at 
the Sub-Committee of the Joint Programme Committee (JPC) level, as this 
Committee is constituted of Majority Party Members, and only one member of 
the Opposition. The Chief Whip of the Largest Minority Party in Parliament is 
the only member of the Opposition who forms part of the membership of this 
Committee.  Speaker, Chairperson NCOP, Chief Whip ANC and House 
                                                 
30
 Section 74 Bills (Constitutional Amendments) – Time limits are constitutionally determined and 
therefore cannot be fast-tracked 
31
 Consideration must be given to the 4-week legislative cycle of the Council, required to inform the 
provincial legislatures and obtain voting mandates. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Current legislative and oversight processes  
 
 
59 
Chairperson are all members of the Majority Party. Whilst very little opposition 
within Parliament was received by parties on any of the Bills „fast-tracked‟, 
civil society, through Cosatu, raised some concerns, although these areas of 
concern could not be tabled, as fast-tracking does not provide for a public 
participation process. 
 
The SAA Unallocatable Debt Bill (1999) is an example of a fast-tracking request. 
The opposition to the bill being passed came from the trade union movement, 
and not from political parties within Parliament. 
 
3.4.3.a. Example of the South African Airways Unallocatable Debt  
 
Government agreed that a phased approach be adopted with reference to the 
sharing of the Transnet debt burden between Transnet and government. R4.05 
billion32 was the gross debt attributable to South African Airways. Of this 
amount, R3.057 billion were deemed unallocatable debt to SAA, which had to 
be shared between government and Transnet. The Act enabled government to 
pay R1.333 billion to discharge a portion of Transnet‟s debt attributable to SAA 
at its incorporation. Cosatu opposed this and proposed that an alternative be 
found to deal with the Transnet debt that did not involve the transfer of public 
funds.  
 
The request from government was that Parliament should pass the bill within in 
the same fiscal year (1999/ 2000), as this bill was necessary to enable 
government, in particular the Ministry of Finance, to appropriate R1.333 billion 
for taking over or sharing the debt burden (Confindential correspondence: A 
letter to LOGB: 21 October 1999). The LOGB requested Parliament to „fast-
track‟ the Bill, as Transnet immediately needed to swop the debt to allay the 
fears of the relevant lenders about the reduction of assets, meaning the sale of 
SAA. All parties in Parliament agreed that the Bill had to be „fast-tracked‟. As 
                                                 
32
 Confidential correspondence A Letter  to LOGB, 21 October 1999 
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mentioned earlier „fast-tracking‟ allows for rules to be suspended. Hence, 
public participation was suspended, and therefore the views of labour 
organisations were not carried.  
 
In interviews conducted a senior Member of Parliament (Interview D) stated 
that: “The power relations between the executive and Parliament are nuanced 
and changes to simple procedures often have a substantial impact on the 
outcome of processes. Fast-tracking of legislation may be necessary but often 
it impacts substantially on the public participation process; it impacts on the 
level of scrutiny of the legislation by Committees.” 
 
It would be important to note that during the period 1999 to 2006, 30 bills 
were fast-tracked through the fast-tracking mechanism. The fast-tracking 
mechanism has been used since 1999. Prior to 1999 Ministers introduced bills 
without deadlines for the passage of legislation being set. Since the 2004 
elections, the then LOGB, Mr Zuma, was reluctant to agree to any „fast-
tracking‟ requests from Ministers unless it was absolutely required and 
necessary, in essence recognising Parliament‟s constitutional obligation in 
passing legislation. The majority of Bills fast-tracked had financial implications, 
or had a deadline as set out in the Constitution. (List of all bills fast-tracked 
1999 – 2006) ( Appendix : 4 )) 
 
According to a senior parliamentary official (Interview E) “It could be argued 
that the reluctance to fast-track was due to the Constitutional Court rulings 
on The National Health Practitioners Act (35,2004) and the Termination of 
Pregnancy Act (38,2004).” These bills had generated great public interest, but 
the majority of provinces did not hold public hearings because of insufficient 
time. Parliament has since acted with caution to avoid any further judgements. 
The Court ruled that the public participation process was compromised at the 
level of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), as they were tagged Section 
76 in terms of the Constitution and for that reason impacted extensively on the 
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provinces (Doctors for Life International vs Speaker of the National Assembly 
and Others 17 August 2006). 
 
The Committee Chairperson (Interview F) observed that: “In moving away 
from the actual processes outlined in the rules, the term „Prioritisation‟ of 
legislation is a term that is being used to an increasing degree to move away 
from blatantly fast-tracking legislation. This, in essence, does not compromise 
the process outlined in the Constitution but can speed up the parliamentary 
process as the need arises.  Bills that government wants passed by Parliament 
at a certain date are prioritised.It follows the normal legislative process, but 
is expedited through Parliament, without sidestepping any of the processes.” 
 
The Companies Amendment Bill is one example of priority legislation. The 
amendment was introduced in late October 2010, prior to adjournment, and 
when Parliament reconvened in February the committee was requested to 
complete its work to ensure that the legislation could be implemented by 31 
March 2011, just on the start of government‟s new financial year. The 
committee practically had six weeks to complete a very comprehensive piece 
of legislation.  
 
The Electoral laws Amendment Bill was introduces in September 2010, and 
followed a speedy process. All the steps in the legislative process were adhered 
to and the Bill was passed by both Houses in November 2010. The Leader of 
Government Business advised Parliament of the importance of implementation 
of the legislation by the end of 2010. He requested the parliamentary 
committee to work towards meeting this deadline to allow the Independent 
Electoral Commission sufficient time to prepare for the local government 
elections.  
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3.4.3.b. Example of the National Environmental Management Act  
 
The National Enviromental Management Act is used to illustrate an example of 
dominance through the process of delegated legislation. Delegated legislation 
is legislation enacted by the executive to regulate matters provided for by the 
original Act in greater detail. In its submission to the Panel for the Assessment 
of Parliament, the Legal Resources Centre cited one such example. Amended 
bill B36B-2007 changes a number of important requirements for environmental 
impact assessments, which are mandatory in terms of the present National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA), to use discretionary provisions33 for 
all activities listed in terms of the Act, in line with the new section 24(4)(b).3: 
“These previously mandatory requirements include mitigation of impacts to 
keep adverse impacts to a minimum, the consideration of alternatives and 
disclosure of gaps in knowledge. Thus the Minister can exercise discretion in 
future to allow any environmental impact assessments.”  
 
Legislation with delegated authority gives the executive the power to pass 
regulations as in the case of environment impact assessments [EIA]. This puts 
the executive in a very powerful position. The executive decides if it wants to 
have an assessment on the impact of mining on the environment. According to 
a Committee Chaiperson (Interview G), concerns were raised about  
…“impacting on the independence of the legislature is the extent to which the 
Executive is able to undermine legislature and the intent of the law-makers 
through delegated legislation”. This view is also expressed by a Senior Member 
of the ANC (Interview H): “It is during the Committee stage that Parliament 
exerts its influence, if any, on legislation, and there are cases where an 
effective chairperson has been able to ensure that amendments proposed by 
civil society or interests groups are accommodated. It is also at the Committee 
level where there has been quite rigorous oversight of executive decisions. 
                                                 
33 Writer’s emphasis  
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The extent of rigour in the debates on legislation and oversight reports differs 
in each Committee.” 
 
According to a Committee Chairperson (Interview I), “The relationship 
between the executive and the committee are impacted by multiple factors 
which include the experience and skill of the Chairperson; and the Minister‟s 
commitment to seriously respond to the Committees‟ concerns. However, 
usually these amendments and oversight of executive decisions are „allowed‟ 
by the executive as long as these do not challenge fundamental political 
positions and resolutions of the ANC; if so, the executive will intervene to 
ensure party policy, which becomes government policy, is achieved.”  
 
3.5. CASE STUDY EXAMPLES OF DOMINANCE  
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature as it plays out 
during parliament‟s engagement in the legislative process is illustrated by the 
following examples: 
 
3.5.1. Policy on HIV/AIDS  
 
A classical example of executive dominance over the legislature is that of the 
Mbeki era executive‟s position on the roll-out of antiretroviral drugs. The Mbeki 
government‟s policy on AIDS and HIV has been contested terrain and strains in 
government‟s thinking around the issue of drugs for HIV/AIDS continued to be 
evident. Not all members of the majority party agreed with the views of the 
former President that the provision of Nevirapine will not assist in lowering the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Subsequently, research has shown 
that if Nevirapine is administered, it could lower the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission (Report of Health Systems Trust:2001). At the time the 
executive‟s view was that dispensing the drug designed to prevent mother-to-
child transmission had to be piloted until enough research proved that the drug 
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would assist in lowering the infection rate. This decision was not based on 
medical research, but rather on „political science‟. In 2010, research reports 
reflect that mothers who are HIV positive and undergo the treatment can have 
healthy babies. Although majority party members who served on the Portfolio 
Committee on Health at the time did not agree with the views of the 
executive, they never raised their concerns in the public domain, and 
supported government‟s position in committee meetings.  
 
In 2000, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) brought a Constitutional Court 
challenge against the Minister of Health, based on government‟s failure to 
administer antiretroviral drugs to HIV positive persons. The Court ruled in 
favour of the TAC and the judgment concluded that the executive cannot act 
with impunity as the executive is bound by the Constitution, for the reason 
that the executive could not exempt its citizens from enjoying access to health 
care as a basic human right. This example shows executive dominance. 
Although some ANC Members raised their views at the Caucus meeting, none of 
them was considered. This suggests that civil society and the courts have 
essentially been the main opposition to executive dominance in the principle of 
separation of powers. Hopkins (2002: 24) gives credence to the role of the 
courts as the most effective checks-and-balances mechanism, as courts act as a 
watchdog over the other organs of government. In the above experience the 
courts and civil society prevailed over executive dominance. 
 
3.5.2. Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000) (PAIA) 
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) was passed by Parliament in 
200034. At a Justice Portfolio Committee meeting in February 2010, where the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development had been presenting its 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), it transpired that one of its KPI‟s was to 
                                                 
34
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group: February 2010 
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ensure government compliance in terms of PAIA. It emerged from the 
Chairperson of the Committee, honourable Llewellyn Landers, 
 
 “that the reason why there were problems with the compliance of 
this Act from government departments was that when it emerged 
during the implementation of the said Act that government 
departments could be brought before court for not providing 
requested information, the Directors-General issued directives to 
their departments to the effect that no PAIA applications should 
be granted 35. Theses directives remain.” 
 
He went on to clarify that, “if the directives were not in written form, then 
such sentiments as to information not being made available had been 
expressed verbally to officials by DGs. He went on to say that for the Act to be 
practically effective all that needed to happen was that all the DGs had been 
called in and were told that PAIA was an Act of Parliament and they had to 
comply with it,” one could not just have mute refusal. Labour unions raised 
concerns about the state witholding information that could be utilised by civil 
society to hold government to account, for example: How36 do farmworkers 
wanting information about a planned buy-out of a farm which threatens their 
jobs respond and prepare for this if the information is not available? Until 
recently many people in these situations faced enormous frustration in 
compelling state organs to make such information available. The Access to 
Information Act should not be circumvented to escape the disclosure of 
information that affects the monitoring of service delivery. 
 
It appears that the committee tried to assert its power over the executive by 
using the legal apparatus that Parliament had itself passed, but again 
Parliament‟s power was restrained when it called the executive to account.  
 
                                                 
35
 COSATU Parliamentary Bulletin, 1 February 2001, page 5. 
35
 The Committee on Public Accounts was formerly know as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. 
36
 The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) formerly known as (SCOPA) the Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts. 
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3.5.3. SCOPA Arms Deal Investigation (2001) 
 
The SCOPA37 Arms Deal illustrates the difficulties in holding the executive to 
account (Esau 2004: 48). The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), as the 
public accounts oversight Committee in Parliament, had taken the decision to 
commission four agencies to investigate the acquisition of arms for the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF). These agencies were the Heath 
Special Investigating Unit (SIU), the Auditor-General (AG), the Public Protector 
(PP) and the Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences (IDSEO). In a 
letter to the then Chairperson of SCOPA, Mr Gavin Wood, the then Deputy 
President and Leader of Government Business, Mr Jacob Zuma, questioned38 
the wisdom of including the SIU and Willem Heath in the investigative team in 
light of the Constitutional Court judgment South African Association of 
Personal Injury Lawyers vs Heath, Willem Hendrik 200, in which it was 
adjudged that Judge Heath‟s involvement with the SIU contravened the 
separation of powers rule and that Proclamation R24 of 1997, which appointed 
him as head of the SIU, was invalid. The letter also questioned the interaction 
of SCOPA with the Executive as it had decided to proceed with the 
investigation without having met with the Ministers of Finance, Trade and 
Industry, Public Enterprises and Defence and also solicited the views of 
Cabinet. The letter also questioned the authority of Parliament to appoint the 
four investigative bodies, which did not report directly to the Committee 
(Letter from LOGB to Speaker Ginwala: Appendix: 2).  
 
In a subsequent letter the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr Frene Ginwala, 
acknowledged that the legislature could only recommend to the executive that 
it appoint the investigative bodies, as its power was persuasive only. This was 
also later acknowledged by Mr Woods. Esau (2004: 50) highlights the change in 
attitude of the COPA Chairperson, an IFP member, after being reprimanded by 
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 Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Report 2000 
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the Speaker and called to apologise to the Ministers for the accusations he had 
made in the (Cape Times: March 29: 2001). ( Letter from Speaker to LOGB: 
appendices: 10). 
 
During a Parliamentary media briefing following his resignation Gavin Woods 
claimed that, “the executive had inordinately influenced ANC members of the 
committee and interfered in the committee‟s oversight role, thereby 
hampering Parliament‟s role of holding the executive accountable to the 
people‟s public representatives”– (Cape Times: February 26: 2002). 
 
In the context of defining the respective roles (Murray: 2002: 90), Dr Frene 
Ginwala further admits that:  
 
“We are still all developing our understanding and trying to give 
effect to the Constitutional relationship between the Executive 
and the legislature. We need to continuously review and improve 
the communication and relationship between the Executive and 
legislature.” 
 
The Constitution clearly sets the stage for the relationship between the 
executive and Parliament, and the Rules provide Parliament‟s committees with 
substantive powers to call to account any person, including members of the 
executive. Despite these powers, Speaker Ginwala was reluctant to implement 
this constitutional provision. 
 
As described in chapter 2, the LOGB is the representative of the executive in 
Parliament, mainly acting as the President‟s „man‟ in Parliament, and not on 
his, own but rather „on behalf of‟. Richard Calland (Mail & Guardian: July 18: 
2011), highlights that, “ Mbeki had decided that the ANC needed to control the 
investigation and so SCOPA was informed by a letter signed by Jacob Zuma, 
who was the then Leader of Government Business in Parliament - but written 
by Mbeki and his chief henchman, Essop Pahad - that it, SCOPA, had made a 
mistake and Heath should be taken off the joint investigating team.”  
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3.5.4. Controversy over National Conventional Arms Control Bill ( 2002) 
 
In 2002 the Committee on Defence deliberated on the National Conventional 
Arms Control Bill. The original version of clause 23(c) of the said Bill had made 
it mandatory for the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) 
to make quarterly reports to the Committee on “all pending export 
applications” and consider any recommendations by the said Committee that a 
permit ought to be denied in a particular application on the grounds that the 
export would be inconsistent with section 15. The minutes of the meeting, 
documented by the PMG39, reflect that: In a subsequent redraft, the 
aforementioned requirement was removed altogether, prompting the then 
Chairperson, Ms Thandi Modise, to state that, “it was [a dismay] that the 
amendments to the Bill supported by the Committee had been overruled, and 
that the Bill has been reworked by the Ministry of Defence.”  
 
The Minister of Defence at the time, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, defended the 
redrafting of clause 23 by explaining to the Committee that the NCACC was a 
Cabinet Committee of Ministers, and to provide that this body should receive 
recommendations from a Parliamentary Committee would be tantamount to an 
infringement on the doctrine of separation of powers. Ms Modise maintained 
that the new clause 23 would provide no recourse for Parliament to perform 
proper oversight of the export of arms at the time of the conclusion of 
transaction. Eventually the ANC‟s parliamentary position was to agree to the 
deletion of clause 23(c), with the DA opposing this. This suggests that the 
Executive had dominance over Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group: Minutes 2010 
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3.5.5. Selection of candidate to the SABC Board (2008)  
 
There are numerous examples40 of how the legislature was expected to rubber 
stamp the decisions taken by the executive. The period that provides the 
strongest possible examples of executive dominance of the legislature is during 
the Mbeki era. During the height of this Executive dominance over the 
legislature, De Vos (2008: 2) explains how ANC MPs were ordered to accept a 
list of „new‟ SABC Board appointees that differed from the list agreed to by the 
portfolio committee after the process of public participation. De Vos further 
refers to the public broadcaster becoming the state broadcaster. During the 
period of the Mbeki demise resurgent MPs were keen to fire the Board that was 
„illegally‟ foisted on them, and did so by passing the Broadcasting Act 
Amendment Bill. The amendments to Section 15 of the Act gave the National 
Assembly the power to remove the SABC Board, a power that was previously 
vested exclusively in the President. Opposition party MP‟s have argued that 
these amendments may be unconstituional as they interfere with the executive 
powers of the President to appoint and remove members of the Board. Whilst it 
could be argued that the public broadcaster should play an important role in 
providing information to assist the electorate in making political choices, the 
public broadcaster has not always provided the electorate with unbiased views. 
The media often reflects more the views of minority interest groups, while the 
majority views that have been endorsed in consecutive elections find no 
expression. Hence, it may have been necessary to ensure that people are 
strategically placed. In this instance Parliament claimed its dominance over the 
executive.  
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 1996 Amendment to the Companies Act. Department of Trade and Industry – used the National Council 
of Provinces (NCOP) to make textual amendments. 1996 - Intellectual Property Bill was substantively 
amended by the department when the bill was already in Parliament 
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3.5.6. Defence Ministry versus Portfolio Committee on Defence (2010)  
 
The Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans had had a dispute 
with the Minister of Defence over the release of the Interim National Defence 
Force Service Commission report, which the committee felt was necessary for 
processing the Defence Amendment Bill. The Minister refused to release the 
report on the basis that it had to be submitted to Cabinet first, which would 
approve and then release it to the committee. The Minister had also assured 
the committee that the contents of the Interim National Defence Force Service 
Commission report were not necessary for processing the Bill. The standoff 
between the committee and the Defence Ministry resulted in the committee 
postponing the processing of the Bill until such time that the Interim National 
Defence Force Service Commission report had been made available and a 30-
day period within which this had to be done had been announced. The LOGB 
met with the Speaker, Minister of Defence and the Chairperson of the 
Committee to resolve the matter. The Speaker of Parliament subsequently 
intervened in the matter and requested the committee to process the Bill in 
spite of the reports not having been received. The committee, on a vote, 
decided to continue with the Bill. During President Zuma‟s reshuffle of 
Parliament and Cabinet, the then Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on 
Defence, Mr Nyami Booi, was replaced. The portfolio committee tried to assert 
its dominance over the executive, but failed. 
 
3.5.7. Money Bills Amendment Procedure Act 2008  
 
The Constitution imposed on Parliament the imperative to pass legislation to 
amend the budget as introduced by the executive. At the ANC‟s Polokwane 
Conference in 2007, calls were made for greater parliamentary oversight over 
the budget process. This is a clear and direct move away from the „Pre-
Polokwane‟, or „Mbeki era‟ take on executive dominance, towards a more 
consensus-driven process between the executive and the legislature to ensure a 
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better life for all, which is in keeping with South Africa‟s commitment at the 
Millennium Summit in 2000 to ensure that Members of Parliament are held 
accountable for the development goals being achieved. 
 
The first attempt to address the constitutional demand to allow Parliament the 
power to amend the budget was in 1997 when the National Treasury, Minister 
Manuel, produced a draft Money Bills Amendment Procedure Bill. The draft bill 
required the Finance committee to give seven days‟ notice of any proposed 
amendments, while the Minister of Finance would have the right to address the 
committee before it tabled any amendments (Gumede 2010: 27). These 
proposals by the executive sent out the clear signal that the executive at the 
time had no intention of allowing the legislature the power and oversight to 
propose amendments to the budget. DBSA (2010: 4) concludes that Parliament, 
in terms of the proposal by the executive, was not allowed to alter the rate the 
or base of time for imposing a tax, thus undermining the effectiveness of 
Parliament in the process, in so doing reducing Parliament to a „rubber 
stamping‟ exercise. 
 
The trade union movement, civil society and Members of Parliament 
vehemently opposed the „executive‟s‟ draft bill, and as a result the draft was 
withdrawn and not formally tabled (People‟s Budget Campaign (2 December: 
2008). Cosatu decided to boycott the parliamentary hearings on the budget 
until Parliament received meaningful powers of amendment and went ahead 
to, together with the SA Council of Churches and the South African NGO 
Coalition, form a People‟s Budget Campaign in 2000. Over the following years 
they released budget proposals and continued to call for legislation to allow 
Parliament to amend money bills. Parliament‟s passing the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure Bill in March 2009, prior to the National Election in May 
2009, is a consequence of the Polokwane calls for the power to be conferred on 
Parliament to amend the budget. 
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The Act gives the legislature the power to amend the budget, but the 
legislature cannot amend it willy-nilly. Theoretically, the legislature has the 
power. The Act spells out a procedure that must be followed to effect 
amendments. The Act determines this relationship as developing the budget 
rather than proposing amendments. The legislature provides input into the 
budgetary process together with the executive on developing the budget prior 
to the introduction of the executive‟s budget proposal. The legislature‟s 
responsibility, for which the Act makes provides for, is co-operation before the 
amendments are proposed, taking into account the state of the economy 
before making any changes.  
 
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure Act changes the way the legislature 
conducts its business. Since the budget is an economic expression of the 
political imperatives, election promises often inform budget priorities. Hence 
government must be held accountable to the electorate by the legislature in 
ensuring that these promises are delivered on. The passing of the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure Act suggests that the legislature asserted dominance 
over the executive. It sent a clear signal to the executive that the legislature 
had taken its constitutional authority seriously by implementing its mandate. 
This legislation was passed during the transitional stage of executive 
dominance.  
 
The case study examples highlighted incidences of initial discord between the 
executive and the legislature, which were later resolved by the leadership 
through greater political management of the process. The majority of bills over 
the past 15 years of democracy had been passed in a harmonious fashion due to 
the common objective of both the executive and the legislature in order to 
reverse the Apartheid statutes so as to reflect a constitutional democracy. 
However, after the establishment of the 2nd Parliament, the legislation 
introduced by the executive reflected new policy imperatives and this required 
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greater consultation with the electorate, often highlighting more areas of 
conflict.  
 
The 4th Parliament in 2009 has since shifted the focus away from passing 
legislation to oversight. The number of bills introduced by the executive has 
decreased considerably. Hence the focus is on strengthening the oversight 
responsibilities by holding the executive accountable to the people. Examples 
of oversight mechanisms are highlighted below to show how the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature plays out in the oversight processes.  
 
3.6. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
 
On assessing Parliament‟s oversight role, constitution-makers were well aware 
of the difficulties of holding the executive to account in a strong party-
parliamentary system (Murray 2004: 87). For this reason, Section 55 spells out 
Parliament‟s oversight role.  
 
Oversight can only be effective if Parliament asserts its independence and 
embraces the authority conferred on it by the Constitution. There are various 
mechanisms that Parliament uses to hold the executive to account. These are: 
questions, committee investigations, fact-finding exercises, debates, members‟ 
statements, submissions of strategic plans and oversight visits by committees. 
 
In an interview with Speaker of the NA, Baleka Mbete, and Chairperson of the 
NCOP, hon Johannes Mninwa Mahlangu (Report on the Assessment of 
Parliament: 2008: 28), they emphasised that- 
 
“the shift in the legislative workload of Parliament has iniated a 
new focus in Parliament: beyond passing Bills, Parliament must 
now focus more closely on assessing the impact of legislation on 
people, programmes and service delivery.” 
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In this regard the Presiding Officers initiated an Equality Review Campaign in 
2006, to assess the impact of legislation that has been passed since 1994. 
 
The three committees dealing with gender and disability issues were requested 
to assess the impact of legislation on these groups. The review process included 
extensive public hearings, which enabled Parliament to gain a clear picture on 
the impact of legislation on our communities (Report of the Joint Monitoring 
Group: 2007). 
 
Although Parliament has in past years developed the mechanisms highlighted 
above to hold the executive to account, oversight is still largely viewed as the 
responsibility of the opposition. In this context oversight has become very 
adversial. If oversight is seen in the context of Parliament working with and 
assisting the executive to deliver much-needed services to the poor, then 
oversight would have achieved its objectives. 
 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Below are views expressed by Members of Parliament during interviews 
conducted with regard to Parliament‟s relationship with the executive in the 
context of oversight. In an interview with a committee chairperson (Interview 
J), it was noted that: “Oversight should be recognised as an element of good 
governance. In most cases the obligation or methods to solicit certain 
information becomes confrontational, or tends to be the case. Tensions 
between the executive and Parliament are sometimes inevitable and should be 
managed properly.”  
 
In the case, in May 2010, the Minister of Defence neglected to furnish the 
committee with a report, as requested, stating the reason as being that 
Cabinet had not been privy to the report and therefore she was unable to give 
the information to Parliament. This developed into tensions between the 
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committee and the Minister and required the intevention of the LOGB and the 
Speaker to resolve the conflict. 
 
According to (Interview K): “We must ensure that government meets its 
obligations as promised at the United Nations, the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals is important for Africa‟s survival.” “Effective 
oversight essentially ensures that government delivers on its election 
promises. Parliament has passed laws over the past 15 years that link up 
directly with the delivery of services in achieving the attainment of the 
MDGs.” The Equality Review Campaign, highlighted above, was used as a tool 
to assist government in attaining targets.”  
 
A Senior Member of Parliament (Interview L) states that: “MPs are well aware 
of the difficulties of holding the executive to account in a proportional 
representation system..He also stated that: “Parliament has not necessarily 
been active overseers of the implementation of the legislation that it has at 
times been forced to pass.”  
 
Murray (2002:89) concurs that despite the constitutional imperatives, the 
legislatures have not been particularly active as overseers of government 
action. A Committee Chairperson (Interview M) observed that: “It is essentially 
a matter of power and whose views should prevail. In my experience - at least 
I‟ve been here in Parliament since 1999 - it tends to be the view of the 
executive that prevails.”  
 
At a meeting of Chairpersons of Committees, the panel was struck by the 
frankness with which some committee chairpersons admitted to their lack of 
influence over the executive. A senior Member of Parliament was quoted 
(Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament 2008: 40) as saying: 
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“I think when we look at the issue of the relationship between the 
committees and the executive, it‟s essentially a matter of power. 
We should not complicate this matter; it‟s about power and whose 
views prevail.  According to my experience … it tends to be the 
view of the executive that prevails. For instance, when I came to 
Parliament, I served in one committee for six years. I left it 
because I was sick and tired of wasting my time because the 
Minister would not listen [to me] as senior Member of Parliament. 
We do not have power … we are not taken seriously.”  
 
De Vos (2008: 2) describes how the party-dominant system affects Parliament. 
Because members of the executive are usually senior members of the governing 
party and also serve in Parliament, more junior members of the governing 
party are often required to oversee and hold to account members of the 
executive, who are also party leaders. Owing to a tradition of strict party 
discipline requiring Members of Parliament to toe the party line, it may be 
difficult for Parliament to exercise its oversight mandate over the executive. 
According to (Interview N): “Consensus is generally reached at the study group 
level.”  
 
In the case of the Defence Amendment Bill 2010, the Minister refused to 
provide the committee with a report on the state of the Defence Force prior to 
the bill being passed in spite of Section 55‟s enabling Parliament by means of 
the power to summon a member of the executive. Initially the portfolio 
committee insisted that the legislation could not be approved unless the 
committee had had insight into report, this issue was resolved at ANC study 
group level and the committee proceeded to approve the bill without being 
given the report. 
 
According to a senior opposition MP (Interview O): “One of the most valuable 
of the committee activities is when members undertake oversight visits; there 
are far more of these oversight visits and I think that‟s something good that 
should be encouraged. My experience is that I learnt a lot from visiting police 
stations and various communities. These visits are very worthwhile and gives 
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us a sense of what the reality is in the lives of the people that we represent, 
and the impact of legislation that we pass.” Another Senior office bearer (MP) 
(Interview P), agreed with the opposition member, saying: “I think the way 
South Africans see oversight is unique. It brings a human element to a very 
sophisticated kind of system, because really we want to see whether or not 
legislation has an impact. Has it improved the lives of people?” Furthermore, 
the Senior office bearer (MP) (Interview Q), argued as follows about the 
importance of the oversight function: “When I visit households in the rural 
areas, I ask about water and sanitation, and if they say, no, we don‟t have 
water and sanitation, then there‟s a problem. It‟s the quality of life, issue and 
it‟s important on our continent. So it‟s not so much about the high-flying 
political oversight, it‟s about bread-and-butter issues. That‟s the humane 
touch to our oversight function.” 
 
It is at this level of engaging with communities that the reality of the impact of 
the legislation that Parliament passes is experienced. Oversight is indeed a very 
important function and cannot be left to opposition parties only. The majority 
received its mandate from the people of South Africa and should take 
collective responsibility for ensuring that basic services are delivered by 
holding government accountable for the implementation of service delivery as 
both the legislature and the exectuive are accountable to the people. In reality 
the electorate sees these two arms as one entity responsible for service 
delivery.  
 
The Implications of the Money Bills Amendment Act 
 
In an attempt to further strenghten Parliament‟s existing oversight mechanisms 
of holding the executive to account, Parliament passsed the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure Act in 2009, prior to the national elections. Depite the 
Constitutional provision that Parliament had to pass legislation to give it the 
power to amend the budget, it had taken 15 years for such legislation to be 
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passed. The Act spells out clear processes to be followed giving parliament 
powers to amend the budget as introduced by the executive. This is a radical 
departure from the precedent of „rubber stamping‟ Cabinet‟s budget proposals. 
 
The implications for the executive are that the budget will be scrutinised in 
more detail, and greater accountability and transparency will be required. 
Whilst the budget is not merely an economic, but instead a political 
expression. It is indeed political imperatives, and often election promises, that 
inform the budget. If government promises to build 50 000 houses, then that 
would be a political imperative influencing the budget. Parliament must then 
be allowed to conduct proper oversight over the executive to ensure that this 
promise is kept. 
 
The Act prescribes a new approach to the budgetary process in South Africa as 
it enables Parliament to interrogate the strategic deployment of resources by 
the government, fFurther providing Parliament with the tools to monitor 
whether budgetary expenditure is achieving the developmental objectives of 
the country. The Money Bills Amendment Procedure Act, imposes greater 
public involvement on the budget process.  
 
A senior MP (Interview R) argued that, “The irony of the passing of this Act is 
that the ANC MPs who were instrumental in drafting the bill are currently all 
members of the executive. The dificulties in implementation for 
Parliamentares more constraining in terms of the deadlines set in the Act. The 
Act sets dates within which timeframe Parliament must conduct certain 
investigations. Parliament should then participate in developing the budget.”  
 
In reality the Act gives too much detail with regard to timeframes that 
Parliament must adhere to, and has a rather constraining effect on Parliament 
with regard to committees being in the position to complete its work. A 
Member of Parliament (Interview S) highlighted that: “An effective Parliament 
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is an essential aspect of the quality of democracy. We must ensure that these 
promises are kept.” She further highlighted that: “This mechanism gives 
members more insight into how government prioritises its spending and, 
coming from a rural community, I would want my community to benefit from 
my position as a member,” thus giving Parliament the power to influence the 
budget process. 
 
In an interview with a Committee Chairperson (Interview T), it emerged that: 
“The budget is a key instrument for ensuring political and economic 
transformation. The budget is a very powerful tool for social transformation. 
In fact, politics and economics are two sides of the same coin; they are not 
separate issues, they go together. Parliament asserted itself by passing this 
Act and therefore we should use it as an oversight tool to hold government to 
account.” 
 
Speaking on government‟s progress in respect of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), Minister Manuel illuminated the important role of Parliament in 
holding the executive to account as far as ensuring that goals and promises to 
the people are achieved. In referring to the importance of the budget as an 
oversight mechanism, Minister Manuel challenged parliament to ensure 
oversight,  basically laying down the gauntlet before Members of Parliament:41  
 
“These tools should serve to empower Members of the legislatures 
and provide a good basis for being able to interrogate priorities as 
well as outcomes of government spending.”  
 
The diagram below illustrates the relationship between the executive and 
Parliament. Parliament, through its mandate at an election, is tasked with 
holding the executive to account. In this regard Parliament is ultimately 
responsible to the electorate.  
                                                 
41
 Trevor Manuel – Minister of National Planning.  “Overview of South Africa’s Progress: Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) Legislative Sector, Parliament, 16-18 March 2011 
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FIGURE 6: Chain of accountability 
 
 
Source: Murray, C and Nijzink, L. 2002, Building Representative Democracy: South 
Africa‟s Legislatures and the Constitution, 89 
 
3.6.1. Role of the LOGB in facilitating oversight processes 
 
In an effort to facilitate effective oversight, the office of the LOGB has 
developed administrative communication mechanisms to assist Parliament in 
ensuring the participation of the executive in parliamentary processes as 
required. The existing mechanisms of questions and ministerial statements, 
Ministers appearing before committees to defend their budgets, tabling of 
reports and strategic plans are all mechanisms that require the assistance of 
the office of the LOGB. An effort has been made to outline how these processes 
give effect to Parliament‟s holding the executive to account. 
 
3.6.1.a. Questions 
 
To ensure that the executive is answerable to Parliament, the questions 
procedure inherited from the Westminster System is one of the mechanisms 
used to hold the executive accountable. In order to focus rigorously on 
interrelated matters, parties prioritise questions to Ministers in a particular 
cluster based on the availability of the Ministers. The LOGB facilitates the 
attendance of the executive in both Houses during oral question time, which 
includes the attendance of the President and Deputy President. Political 
parties are informed timeously of the non-availability of a Minister to respond 
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to an oral question to allow the party to reprioritise the question to a Minister 
who is available. This process enables parties to utilise the opportunity to put 
supplementary questions. 
 
The LOGB furthermore, reports to Cabinet at its fortnightly meetings on 
outstanding questions. Ministers are informed through this mechanism of all 
unanswered questions. Ministers report to the LOGB on delays in replies and 
what constraints their departments experienced in preparing responses. The 
Speaker reqularly informs the LOGB of delayed replies. These are 
communicated to the parliamentary liaison officers and also to the Ministers at 
the Cabinet meetings. These mechanisms assist Parliament with ensuring that 
questions are replied to within the allocated time period. 
 
3.6.1.b. Ministerial Statements 
 
A Minister could request the Speaker for an opportunity to make a statement 
on a matter of public importance. A statement normally relates to government 
policy, any executive action or other similar matter of which the Assembly 
should be informed (NA: Rule 106). The Rules provide that, whenever possible, 
a copy of the statement should be provided by the LOGB to the leader of each 
party when or before the statement is delivered. The office of the LOGB 
ensures that party leaders are given hard copes of the statement at 11h00, 
prior to the sitting of the House starting at 14h00, on a particular day. This 
allows parties adequate time to prepare their responses. 
 
3.6.1.c. Ministers’ Participation in Committee Meetings 
 
The Minsters are the policy drivers in government; they are the political heads 
of their departments and it is indeed government policy imperatives that 
inform a budget. These policy imperatives should be presented to the 
committees and defended by the Ministers. Ministers should be cognisant of the 
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power given to Parliament in terms of the Money42 Bills Amendment Procedure 
Act, and therefore should work with committees to ensure that policy 
imperatives are achieved. The mechanisms to facilitate formal interaction 
between committees and Ministers have not been implemented and should be 
highlighted as a potential mechanism for accountability.  
 
The Oversight and Accountability Model: (2008) further highlights potential 
mechanisms for further strengthening the role of the LOGB in ensuring 
executive accountability: 
 tracking and monitoring executive compliance in respect of issues 
that an individual Member of Parliament raised arising from 
constituency work, ensuring a more co-ordinated, integrated and 
holistic approach to parliamentary oversight;  
 assisting with co-ordinating all oversight-related information 
gathered through Parliament‟s public participation activities;  
 assisting with monitoring and tracking executive compliance with 
House resolutions; 
 assisting with monitoring and tracking of government assurances and 
commitments that emanate from the floor of both Houses;  
 monitoring and analysing debates, discussions and comments made 
by the public and participants in the sector parliaments, with a view 
to advising the Houses on issues for consideration. 
 
The Oversight Model: (2009) illuminates the tracking of „House Resolutions with 
Executive Compliance‟ as a crucial tool in Parliament‟s oversight function. In 
this regard the office of LOGB and the National Assembly Table are in the 
process of developing systems on how to track executive responses to ensure 
that they are complied with. The model further highlights potential 
mechanisms to strengthen Parliament‟s oversight role by recommending that a 
                                                 
42
 A Bill is a Money Bill if it appropriates money and imposes taxes, levies and duties. Only the Minister of 
Finance can introduce a Money Bill in the National Assembly. 
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Governance Assurance Committee be established to govern the work of other 
parliamentary committees, to ensure that parliament pursues all assurances 
and undertakings made by Ministers on the floor of the National Assembly. 
However, experience suggests that compliance remains a problem. A senior 
parliamentary official (Interview U) stated, “to date none of these potential 
instruments such as the super-committees for conducting oversight in a 
systematic way has been developed. Parliament has over the years spent vast 
amounts of time and money on delivering reports on how effectively to 
oversee government, but has not implemented many of these proposals.” 
 
3.7. SUMMARY 
 
The chapter provided an overview of the legislative and oversight processes in 
Parliament. With the advent of democracy in 1994, the new cadre of legislators 
were faced with the daunting task of having to rewrite the Statute Book to 
reflect the spirit and intent of the new constitutional order. These processes 
are imposed on Parliament by the Constitution. The Constitution outlines the 
legislative process in detail, thus binding Parliament legally to ensure that the 
provisions in the Constitution are upheld, with a view to strengthening 
democracy. 
 
A detailed discussion of the legislative process was provided, focusing on the 
different categories of bills, the legislative processes followed and the passage 
of a bill through Parliament. Whilst the legislative process, as outlined in the 
Constitution, is adhered to, the system of proportional representation, with its 
strong party dominance, provides the opportunity for controversial legislation 
to be approved.  
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A key feature of the legislative process is the involvement of the public, an 
aspect which is prescribed by the Constitution. Public participation in the 
legislative process plays a crucial role in providing a forum for the public to 
participate in law-making. Lately civil society has been playing a more 
dominant role in raising objections to some pieces of legislation. Opposition 
parties have used the courts to raise their opposition to legislation rather than 
using Parliament as a vehicle for raising these objections. In this way the public 
and civil society exert their control over the executive by means of the courts. 
 
Following the discussion of the legislative process, the chapter proceeded to 
discuss oversight. It was pointed out that over the last couple of years, there 
has been a shift away from passing legislation to one of exercising oversight of 
the executive, thereby ensuring that the government is accountable to the 
public. Although the South African Constitution imposes an obligation on 
Parliament to hold the executive to account and to conduct oversight, in most 
instances the majority party members are reluctant to call their own Ministers 
to account as this is mainly seen as being the role of the opposition parties. 
 
The Assembly and Council are still clarifying their oversight roles, in particular 
the Council, as the Constitution appears to have given it a limited role. 
Parliament recently concluded work on the oversight model. The model 
highlights mechanisms to strengthen oversight and accountability. However, it 
is still early days and the real test will come with the implementation of the 
model. The legislature has been widely praised in respect of the number of 
bills passed to date that seek to amend apartheid laws. All eyes are once again 
focused on the legislature to see if it will live up to its promise of exercising 
effective oversight and ensuring accountability of the executive. 
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The lack of effective oversight can ultimately hamper the delivery on or 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Very often these power relations 
are nuanced and changes through simple procedures, which often have a 
substantial impact on processes and outcomes. Despite the provisions in the 
Constitution to ensure oversight of executive action, including the firm 
proposals outlined in the Oversight and Accountability Model, the legislature 
has not been particularly active as overseers of executive action. In practice 
the recommendations outlined in the oversight model have not been 
implemented. To date none of the super-committees has been established to 
oversee the executive in a systematic manner. At this stage, in the absence of 
the establishment of the oversight advisory section and the Government 
Assurance Committee to oversee the executive, the Money Bills Amendment 
Procedure Act has, since 2009, changed the way the legislature conducts its 
business in overseeing the executive. The Act prescribes a new approach to the 
budgetary process in South Africa as it enables the legislature to interrogate 
the strategic deployment of resources by government. The Act also imposes 
greater public involvement in the budgetary process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE 
LEGISLATURE IN THE LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The chapter analyses the findings in Chapter 3, explaining the actions, 
implications and the impact in the context of separation of powers. The 
relationship between the executive and the legislature is complex and 
dynamic, and cannot be understood in isolation of party-political dominance. 
The level of political contestation among the executive, legislature and 
judiciary depends on how power is distributed among these spheres of 
government and civil society. The practice is, in many instances, different from 
the theoretical construct and doctrine of separation of powers. 
 
The contest for power between the executive and the legislature is not only 
limited to the legislative process, but also occurs between the executive, the 
legislature and the judicary. In the case against government‟s HIV policy, the 
courts ruled in favour of civil society, as represented by the TAC. The contest 
between government parties and civil society is also evident when appointing 
people to key positions, as in the case of the appointment of the SABC Board. 
These appointments are referred to as deployment by the political party as it 
means placing people in strategic positions.  
 
The information is organised into four sections. Section one deals with the 
party-political dominance in Parliament. Section two explains executive 
dominance, section three deals with parliamentary dominance and section four 
summarises the chapter. 
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4.2. PARTY-POLITICAL DOMINANCE 
 
The synergies between the executive and the legislature are in most cases due 
to the fact that most Members of Parliament belong to the same political 
party, the ANC. The ANC has an almost two-thirds majorty vote. The executives 
of government are all drawn from the most senior and influential members of 
the ANC. The parliamentary backbenchers are often beholden to these senior 
party members for the positions they hold in terms of the proportional 
representative system.  
 
The South African Constitution, adopted in 1996, provided for an electoral 
system that was based on Proportional Representation (PR). There are 
currently 13 political parties that are represented in the National Assembly, 
which is an increase from 7 in 1994, 13 in the 1999 elections and 15 in 2007, 
after floor-crossing. A feature of this proportional representation system is the 
representation of one-member parties. The increase in the number of political 
parties came as a result of floor-crossing legislation adopted in 2002, for which 
Parliament amended the Constitution to allow elected representatives to 
change their political affiliations without losing their seats at national and local 
government levels. 
 
The National Assembly has a membership of 400 women and men. After the 
2009 elections, the African National Congress (ANC) attained 264 seats, the 
Democratic Alliance 67, the Congress of the People 30, and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party 18 seats, followed by the smaller parties with 4, 3, 2 and 1 seat 
each. The ANC is three seats short of a two-third majority, which is comprises 
267 seats. A two-thirds majority would put the ANC in a very powerful and 
dominant position when it comes to amending the Constitution, for which such 
majority is required. (See appendix: 3) 
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The current party-dominant system, in which Members are chosen from party 
lists rather than by means of direct election, makes Members of Parliament 
accountable to their party rather than to the people. As long as there is no 
disjuncture between the executive and the leadership of the majority party in 
Parliament, the executive will influence and exert its power on and control 
over the legislature. The party has absolute control over MPs‟ careers in the 
proportional representation system. 
 
The influence of political parties on the ability of members to freely express 
themselves is strengthened by the unconditional power of the political parties 
to remove their members from Parliament. Section 47(3)(c) of the Constitution 
specifies that a person loses his or her membership of the National Assembly if 
that person “ceases to be a member of the party that nominated that person 
as a member of the Assembly”.  
 
Members of Parliament retain their seats through their membership of their 
political parties. The fact that the executive is drawn from the legislature 
tends to weaken the oversight role of the legislature. Oversight generally 
seems to be the responsibility of opposition parties. 
 
The Independent Panel Assessment Report (2006), which to assessed whether 
Parliament was honouring its constitutional mandate, focused extensively on 
the impact of single-party dominance in a system of proportional 
representation. They contended that: 
 
The convergence of party leadership and the executive undermined 
the independence of the legislature. The party leadership, who 
were in effect the executive, determined the agenda and outcomes 
of processes in the legislature, thus effectively undermining the 
independence of the legislature.  
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One could argue that this situation is inevitable in a proportional 
representation system in any democracy where the party has a large controlling 
majority, and where members of the legislature may be reluctant to call to 
account a government that consists of the leaders of their party.  
 
The proponents of the electoral change argue that Members of Parliament are 
more accountable to their political parties in the PR system, therefore 
eliminating the basic tenet of accountability in democracy. One could argue 
that this situation is inevitable in a proportional representation system in any 
democracy.  
 
4.3. EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE 
 
Ministers and committee chairpersons are all from the majority party. 
Chairpersons would rather consult with Ministers on the proposed legislation 
tabled before Parliament and work through areas of concern than air views in 
public. In most instances the executive seems to win the turf battles, as the 
legislation is, almost always, approved as the executive proposes. Consensus is 
generally reached at study group level. Esau (2005: 46) highlights how, through 
regular party caucuses, members of political parties speak with one voice in 
the larger setting of Parliament. 
 
Ministers are members of the study groups. Very often Ministers intervene at 
this level, either by discussing non-negotiables or by indicating what they are 
open to amending. or by identifying areas that require strengthening. Very 
often the portfolio committees, chaired by the majority party, take on board 
the suggestions made by the Minister at the study group meetings. Study group 
meetings are in the main platforms to discuss ANC or government policy 
imperatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Relationship between executive and legislature in the legislative and 
oversight processes 
 
 
90 
It is during the parliamentary deliberations on legislation that the executive is 
in constant interaction with members of the majority party who serve on the 
various portfolio committees. Parliamentary liaison officers, who are officials 
of the Ministers, attend all portfolio committee deliberations on legislation and 
other matters to ensure that all matters affecting the executive are 
communicated to the Minister and to the office of the LOGB. This provides 
government with a „bird‟s eye view‟ on matters that are being considered by 
Parliament. 
 
In the case of the Defence Amendment Bill 2010, the Minister had refused to 
provide the committee with a report on the state of the Defence Force prior to 
the bill being passed. Initially the portfolio committee insisted that the 
legislation could not be approved unless the committee had had insight into the 
report. However, the matter was resolved at ANC study group level and the 
committee proceeded to approve the bill, without having beenbeing given the 
report by the department. 
 
The evidence in chapter 3 contradicts Esau‟s theory in Chapter 2, of the 
„balance of power‟, and the theory of the „separation of powers‟. Certainly 
approval by the one arm is required to ensure enactment and implementation 
of government policy, but how this approval is achieved is not by means of the 
„balance of power‟. The theory is different from the practice. In practice the 
power is tilted unequally in favour of the executive.  
 
The example of the investigation by SCOPA into government‟s arms  purchases 
highlights how Parliament‟s role was undermined by the executive and that 
Parliament‟s leadership, i.e. the Speaker, did not defend its committee. SCOPA 
was informed by the executive that it should operate within the ambit of the 
legislative authority and that calling to account a special investigative body 
was venturing into the domain of the executive, this is testimony that the 
theory is different from the practice. The practice corroborates Rautenbach 
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and Malherbe‟s theory, outlined in chapter 2, that Montesquieu erroneously 
misinterpreted the separation of powers doctrine in the parliamentary system.  
 
The Access to Information Act further illuminates executive dominance, in this 
instance it was not the Minister, but rather state department officials, who did 
not comply with the portfolio committee‟s requests to provide it with certain 
information. In this case the committee chairperson was reluctant to hold the 
officials accountable, although they were in violation of the law by not 
providing Parliament with the relevant information. Members of the majority 
party in particular were unwilling to subject the government to rigorous 
scrutiny for fear of being perceived as being disloyal to their party. The largest 
factor that contributes to executive dominance is single-party dominance and 
the party representation system.  
 
Balutis (1979: 43 ) observed that while constitutions separates authority among 
the three spheres of government, there is a good deal of overlap among the 
institutions and that, in fact, they share responsibility. Parliament must pass 
legislation that is implementable. It would be short-sighted to pass legislation 
that actually cannot be implemented by the executive. It is at the 
implemetation level that civil society is affected, and where it benefits from 
the laws passed by Parliament. Hence it is imperative that legislation seeks to 
provide realistic implementation processes. 
 
The overwhelming single-party dominance, with a strong executive, does not 
necessarily mean that democracy is constrained and that the only views that 
inspire legislation are those of the executive and Cabinet. The party views and 
policies are developed through the party‟s consultation with its members and 
branches at grassroots level. This consultation with party branches happens at 
the ANC‟s policy conferences. This is where policy is debated, linking it to the 
Bill of Rights as set out in the Constitution, and the ideals of a better life for 
all as set out in the (RDP 1994).  
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The Mbeki government‟s HIV /AIDS policy was in conflict with the Constitution 
and the culture of human rights. Many ANC MPs opposed the rationale behind 
that policy. Despite their speaking out at caucus meetings, they were unable to 
influence the executive. After years of executive dominance challenged by civil 
society, the courts eventually pronounced that the executive‟s views on the 
matter were unconstitutional. In this regard the courts have been the major 
opponent to executive dominance in the context of the „separation of powers‟, 
giving credence to South Africa‟s democracy. Whilst the overwhelming majority 
of bills were passed without any discord between the executive and 
Parliament, this does not reflect that democracy is constrained, as it is 
important for both Parliament and government to ensure that the Statutes 
reflect a culture of human rights and constitutional democracy. 
 
4.4. PARLIAMENTARY DOMINANCE 
 
Parliament has not necessarily shown willingness to assert its independence 
from the executive. In instances of conflict Parliament has proved more willing 
to allow the executive to win the turf battles. In the view of some 
commentators Parliament has been relegated to playing a „rubber-stamping‟ 
role for executive decisions. One such example is the dissolution of the 
Directorate of Special Operations, known as the Scorpions, together with the 
tabling of the SA Police Services Amendment Bill, which reflects how the 
relationship is skewed in favour of the executive. 
 
There are a few incidences of Parliament drafting its own bills. The two 
examples below reflect the most discord between the executive and 
Parliament in the legislative process. There are other examples, such as the 
floor-crossing legislation, that reflect less tension.I In this case the legislation 
was drafted by the executive and pioneered by the Justice portfolio 
committee. There were nevertheless members of the ANC who did not support 
the idea, who referred to the legislation as „political expedience‟, arguing that 
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the legislation was not based on the principles of the ANC. The floor-crossing 
legislation was also referred to as “crosstitution” by Cassie Aucamp of the 
Afrikaner Eenhiedsbeweging (AEB), (Parliament since 1994 (2006:88)) 
 
The Broadcasting Act and the Money Bills Amendment Procedure Act are two 
examples of where the legislature was able to challenge the executive and 
approved bills independent of executive interference. In such instances the 
legislature will only be able to challenge the executive in so-called transitional 
periods, such as the short period during which the leadership change at the 
ANC‟s national conference in the now infamous Polokwane took place. Former 
President Mbeki lost the ANC Presidency, but still had government and 
executive power, when the new party leadership moved to regain control over 
the executive.  
 
At that juncture the legislature was given the space, and indeed MPs were 
encouraged to take on, to undermine, the „old‟ executive as part of the power 
play to remove them, in so doing allowing the new, emerging party leadership 
to gain control of the executive. At such times the ANC members of the 
legislature are “allowed” to attack their very own Ministers, not because they 
are courageous, but because they are very aware that ultimately the party 
leadership will prevail. In essence they remain servants of the party, and they 
know that their careers depend on their loyalty to the party. At the first 
parliamentary caucus of the ANC after the Polokwane Conference, it was 
Gwede Mantashe who addressed MPs as the newly elected Secretary General. 
This was the first time that a Secretary General of the party addressed a 
parliamentary caucus. It never happened during the Mbeki Presidency of the 
ANC. In this instance the party line was laid down to the MPs by the Secretary 
General. 
 
Soon after the party leadership managed to gain control of the executive, the 
space that MPs were granted to take on the „old executive‟ was slowly but 
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surely removed. This corroborates with views expressed by De Vos (2008:2) in 
chapter 3, highlighting that the party has absolute control over MPs. 
 
The examples used in chapter 3 mainly highlight discord and executive 
dominance, but the overwhelming majority of bills are passed without incident, 
therefore reflecting a harmonious relationship. The procedure outlined in the 
legislative process is not circumvented, and Parliament engages with civil 
society during the public particiption process to enhance the concept of 
participatory democracy. If any of the recommendations by the opinion-makers 
are not considered by Parliament, then these opinions are raised via the courts. 
the courts have thus become the counterweight to executive dominance, as in 
the example of the Treatment Action Campaign vs the Minister of Health with 
regard to the roll-out of antiretroviral drugs to HIV positive mothers. There are 
the examples of the Termination of Pregancy Bill and the Health Care 
Practitioners bill, which were referred back to Parliament for reconsideration 
due to the lack of proper public consultation processes.  
 
The process of the executive drafting legislation must be balanced with 
Parliament asserting itself during the parliamentary engagement on legislation. 
This can mainly happen at the committee stage of the legislative process. The 
executive developes the budget, Parliament approves the budget but 
Parliament should hold the executive to account for the way that the budget is 
implemented.  
 
4.5. LEADER OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS 
 
It is evident that throughout the parliamentary processes the office of the 
LOGB plays a significant role in ensuring that government‟s priorities are met. 
The LOGB is an executive function and has an administrative function based in 
Parliament, but has a more substantive role for the executive. It entrenches 
the power of the executive, and contributes to executive dominance in 
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ensuring that government priorities are achieved. The LOGB is not a neutral 
role, it is tilted in favour of the executive and intervenes on behalf of the 
executive in the legislative process.  
 
In addition, the office is tilted towards Parliament and weighted in favour of 
Parliament in matters relating to Parliament in terms of its oversight function. 
This position is a balance between the executive and Parliament. It supports 
each arm of government in exercising its functions. The LOGB plays a role in 
assisting Parliament with exercising its oversight function with regard to 
ensuring that Ministers are available to respond to questions in both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Furthermore, the 
office of the LOGB ensures the participation of Ministers in debates, and to 
make statements in the House on matters of public importance in terms of the 
Rules.  
 
The office thus plays a dual role in supporting both Parliament and the 
executive, ensuring that both roles of both oversight and accountability are 
played in achieving the constitutional mandate of each of these two arms of 
government. The role of the Leader of Government Business becomes one of 
the peace-maker role in cases of tension between these two arms of 
government, where he often has to intervene at study group level between the 
Minister and the committee, and also at the level of the Speaker, when 
consensus must be reached with the opposition parties.  
 
The factors that impact on the power relations between Parliament and the 
executive are complex. In a vibrant constitutional democracy it is important to 
manage the tensions between the different branches of government, where it 
is normal to have tensions. It is the manner in which these tensions are 
managed that is important. The management of the disagreement must reflect 
the values enshrined in the Constitution and respect the theoretical and 
functional understanding of the separation of powers. In cases such as these, 
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where tensions were resolved between Parliament and the executive, former 
Speaker Ginwala referred to Jacob Zuma, when he was the LOGB, as a „friend 
to Parliament‟. 
 
During the Jacob Zuma era, the LOGB was instrumental in developing 
mechanisms to faciltate communication with other political parties. The LOGB 
convened regular meetings with leaders of opposition parties. This platform 
provided parties with the opportunity to engage the executive through the 
LOGB on matters that affected plitical parties inside and outside of Parliament. 
This platform is very similar to the Leader of the House in Britain, where the 
leader takes questions in the Commons on days allocated for that purpose on 
matters relating to executive proposals. 
 
The office of the LOGB mainly serves as the Leader‟s principal point of contact 
with all Directors-General, the Cabinet Secretariate, presiding officers, the 
majority party chief whip, chairpersons of committees, MPs, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) Ambassadors, and parliamentary officials. In linking up 
with various stakeholders both in and outside of Parliament, the office conveys 
political and procedural concepts and ideas in terms of parliamentary 
processes. These are mainly based on the political strategy of the day, ensuring 
that the mandate of the majority party is delivered. 
 
4.6. SUMMARY 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is shaped by the 
electoral system of proportional representation.This has a major impact on 
how this relationship plays itself out in legislative and oversight processes. The 
executive dominance, where Ministers and chairpersons of committees are all 
from the same party, determines the outcomes of major decisions in 
Parliament. 
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The period 1994 to 2004 mainly focused on passing laws that were in line with 
the contitutional democracy and eradicating oppressive Apartheid laws from 
the Statute Book. In this regard the realtionship between the executive and 
Parliament depicted a more harmonious synergy, as the objectives were 
mutual. There were, however, occassions of discord during the same period, 
and these were identified and analysed. 
 
Parliament‟s oversight power is increasingly being questioned as it seems that 
conducting oversight is in the main the responsibility of the opposition parties 
in Parliament. Oversight should be recognised as a mechanism to assist the 
government to deliver to the people who elected it. Through conducting 
oversight, the areas of concern relating to delivery are highlighted by 
Parliament to ensure that the government makes good on its election promises.  
 
The party-dominant system, with single-party dominance, in theory seems to 
constrain democracy. In this regard, having one party with a close to two-thirds 
majority, presents the notion of “ruling with an iron fist” and is likened to a 
“dictatorship”. In reality Parliament has, over the years, been able to stamp its 
authority on matters that required Parliament‟s showing it can assert its 
dominance.  
 
In summary, the synergies and regular agreement between the executive and 
the legislature is not because of the balance of powers, but single-party 
dominance. The next chapter provides conclusions and recommendations to 
strengthen the support lent to the Leader of Government Business in the effort 
to honour the political mandate. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVES  
 
The primary objective of the study was to examine the concept of the 
separation of powers between the executive and the legislature and the impact 
on the relationship between the executive and Parliament in the legislative 
process. 
 
Theoretically, the separation of powers exist, but empirical evidence 
contradicts the theory. There is no Chinese wall that separates the two arms of 
government, because political party members have representation in the 
different spheres of government in the same proportion as their political 
support. As described in chapter 2, there is no watertight 
compartmentalisation of the arms of government. They are interdependent and 
interlinked; they have a symbiotic relationship. Government requires 
Parliament to pass its legislative proposals and the budget that is required to 
implement government policy and to reform the country. 
 
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is dynamic, and is 
very complex. It is mainly determined by the proportional representation 
system. The power is weighted heavily in favour of the executive, although the 
relationship is not stagnant, with the legislature waiting for the executive to 
determine the outcome of decisions. The relationship changes daily depending 
on the issues, while the legislature will assert it‟s authority if the executive 
ventures too far into its terrain.  
 
Secondly, the role of the LOGB was examined in relation to the legislative and 
oversight processes and its impact. The LOGB plays a significant role in the 
legislative process, monitoring government‟s programme and hastening the 
progress by consulting various role-players within Parliament. In this way the 
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LOGB ensures that government priorities area are achieved. Translating 
political imperatives into administration is an important role of the office of 
the LOGB. 
 
The LOGB is an executive function based in Parliament. Importantly, the office 
is the interface between Parliament and the executive. It provides Parliament 
with information to assist in ensuring the participation of the executive in 
parliamentary proceedings. It supports the executive in relation to ensuring 
that Parliament passes government‟s legislative priorities.  
 
The LOGB is weighted in favour of the executive on matters relating to the 
achievement of government‟s legislative priorities and is weighted in favour of 
Parliament on matters relating to Parliament in terms of its oversight 
functions. This position is a balance between the executive and Parliament. It 
supports each arm of government in exercising its function. 
 
The LOGB recognises Parliament‟s constitional obligation in the legislative 
process and works alongside Parliament, ensuring that fewer bills were fast-
tracked during the past six years. The period 1994 to 2004 focused extensively 
on ridding the Statute Book of discriminatory Apartheid legislation. It is 
therefore no surprise that the fast-tracking mechanism was introduced in 1999. 
Prior to that the executive could introduce legislation without having to comply 
with any administrative deadlines. In some cases bills were passed speedily, 
depending on the nature of the amendment, while obviously technical 
amendments were passed very swiftly. It could therefore be argued that the 
fast-tracking mechanism assisted both Parliament and the executive. 
 
The LOGB is required to speak on behalf of government on a range of issues. 
The examples highlighted in chapter 3 show how the LOGB was instrumental in 
communicating legislative matters to Parliament for consideration. The LOGB 
plays a key role in ensuring that government‟s legislative priorities are met in 
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Parliament. The executive develops the legislative agenda of Parliament; the 
majority of parliamentary business is government business. Due to the „fusion 
of power‟ appropriate „checks and balances‟ between the arms of government 
ensure accountability and openness. Ministers can be summoned to appear 
before any committee to account on matters relating to their respective 
departments.  
 
5.2. SEPARATION OF POWERS  
 
The central feature of the doctrine of separation of powers is that there must 
be effective checks and balances and that the excessive concentration of 
power in a single organ or person is an invitation for abuse. The doctrine is 
highlighted as the system that helps to energise government, and to make it 
more effective by creating a healthy division of labour.  
 
In Westminster-like democracies such as South Africa, the separation of powers 
is complete in so far as the judiciary is concerned. The courts have to be 
beyond political interference from Parliament or government, but the 
executive and legislative powers are not as separate as they are in non- 
Westminster systems.  
 
The role of the courts in terms of the South African Constitution is to protect 
individual rights. At times, in asserting this function, the courts will have to 
intrude to some extent on the terrain of the executive and the legislature. 
However, in doing so the courts must remain sensible to the constitutional 
interest of the other arms of government and seek to ensure that the intrusion 
is based on constitutional principles and not on power over the other arms of 
government. The courts have played a pivotal role in ensuring that executive 
dominance in the legislative process is overturned.  
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The separation of powers between the President, Cabinet and Parliament in 
the parliamentary system is not as clearly separated. The President is elected 
by Parliament on the outcome of a parliamentary/national election. The 
Ministers are also Members of Parliament, so the separation between these two 
arms of government is not very clear and separate. The President appoints 
his/her Cabinet from Members of Parliament. Members of Parliament form the 
government, and they vote in Parliament to support their own legislation and 
serve on party study groups, where they discuss and exert influence on major 
policy decisions of the party. In chapter 2, it was observed that there was no 
watertight compartmentalisation of the three arms of government . 
 
In theory, the arms have separate roles and functions, but in practice they are 
interlinked and co-operate as required. Members of the judiciary are appointed 
by the President with the participation of the legislature and the judiciary 
through the Judicial Services Commission. In the case of the Chief Justice, he 
presides over Parliament when the President is elected.  
 
The mechanisms to ensure the „checks and balances‟ are highlighted through 
the Public Protector keeping a „watchful eye‟ for any perceived wrongdoing. In 
recent times the opposition parties have used the Public Protector to highlight 
certain areas governance and administration with which that they were not 
happy. The Public Protector‟s reports were submitted to the President for 
action, these reports also give dates for the required response from the 
President. 
 
In the American Presidential system, the President is elected in a separate 
election from the congressional election. This separation seems more distinct 
in that system of government. The President selects Ministers from outside of 
Congress, theoretically signifying the separation. When certifying the 
Constitution, the court recognised that there is no universally accepted system 
for achieving the separation of powers. 
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In practice the clear and distinct roles outlined in the theory are not entirely 
separate asthey overlap and are interlinked. There is a healthy interaction 
between the executive and Parliament; Ministers respond to questions, and 
also brief committees as required. The separation of power is part and parcel 
of the constitutional future of South Africa. 
 
The sharp contrast between the Westminster and Presidential systems is that 
Ministers in Westminster systems are accountable to Parliament, but in 
Presidential systems Ministers don‟t account to Parliament for what they do as 
they are not members of Congress. 
 
5.3. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
 
The Constitution outlines the legislative process in detail, thus binding 
Parliament legally to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are upheld 
to strengthen democracy. Whilst provisions of the Constitution are adhered to, 
the system of proportional representation, with strong party dominance 
provides the opportunity for government‟s legislative programme to be 
implemented without too much resistance. Public participation is a key feature 
in the legislative process. This process is outlined in the Constitution and 
recognises the important role that communities and civic organisations play in 
ensuring that the voice of the people is recognised in the legislative process. 
The LOGB is cognisant of Parliament‟s important responsibility to provide a 
platform for the public to engage on legislation before Parliament, and has not 
requested Parliament to fast-track legislation recently. 
 
The legislative process during committee engagement is indeed the actual 
stage where the relationship between the executive and Parliament is played 
out. The convergence of party leaders and the executive determines the 
outcomes of processes. This relationship, which is determined by the the 
Proportional Representation system, does not reflect negatively on democracy. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
 
103 
The majority is mandated at the polls in an election. In this, the electorate 
hands over its power to the majority. Therefore the majority‟s views are 
carried through the development of policy reform led by government. 
Parliament provides a platform for minority views to be considered, and this is 
done through the committee‟s processing of legislation in the public 
participation process. 
 
Prior to the introduction of legislation, the executive consults extensivley with 
civil society during the Green and White Paper processes. Often considerable 
networking takes place. Public comment is invited before the executive 
introduces a bill.  
 
In the legislative process in South Africa, democracy is not constrained by the 
large single-party dominance. Public consultation on proposed policy takes 
place from inception to the final passing of the bill. A recent example is the 
proposed „toll roads‟. Although consultations had taken place at the beginning 
of the process, government reconsidered the matter due to the huge public 
interest at the concluding stage prior to implementation. The example of The 
Access to State Information Bill further highlights how civil society is not 
restricted in making their voices heard, even up to the last minute. The bill is 
being reconsidered by the committee, taking into account the concerns raised 
by civil society.  
 
5.4.OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
 
Parliament has, in terms of the Constitution, installed mechanisms to ensure 
that the executive is answerable to Parliament for its actions. These 
mechanisms have been outlined in chapter 3, holding the executive to account 
and should best be utilised to achieve the priorities and promises made in an 
election. Oversight should be seen as a vehicle to ensure that government 
implements legislation passed by Parliament, and delivers services to the 
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people. Parliament is in the process of strengthening the committee support 
system to ensure that committees are adequately resourced to exercise more 
effective oversight. Hence meaningful oversight requires that the interaction 
between Parliament and the executive is guided by the goal of ensuring 
effective governance and service delivery to the people.  
 
The responsibility of holding the executive to account in parliamentary systems 
of government is often perceived as the role of opposition parties. Since the 
opposition parties are the main drivers of oversight it tends to make oversight 
more adversial. This aspect of opposition politics focuses on apportioning 
blame to the executive rather than finding solutions to meeting the needs of 
the people.  
 
5.5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The NA Rule focuses strongly on linking the role of the LOGB to the executive 
only.  However, the office of the LOGB has developed into one that performs a 
dual function supporting both the executive and the legislature. Parliament 
relies more and more on this office in executing its oversight responsiblities 
with regard to the functions of programming by ensuring the availability of the 
executive, tracking matters of executive compliance and tracking vacancies in 
institutions that support democracy.  
 
The first 15 years of democracy were mainly dedicated to passing laws and 
eradicating the statutes of discriminatory Apartheid legislation. In order for 
Parliament effectively to shift energies and resources into developing a more 
strategic approach to delivering on oversight, a number of factors must be 
considered that may allow committees to perform the oversight function 
satisfactorily.  
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The following recommendations outline mechanisms to assist the office of the 
LOGB in developing a parliamentary programme that links legislative oversight 
to the work of committees, being the engine room of Parliament, in order to 
perform the oversight function and to promote executive accountability: 
 
1. A shift in the idea of what parliamentary work is should be highlighted. 
Parliamentary work should include committee work, constituency 
work, and plenaries. It should no longer be narrowly confined to the 
plenary of the two Houses only. Oversight should form the bulk of 
parliamentary work. Parliament should raise public awareness that 
parliamentary work is not only done when debates take place in the 
Assembly. The public perception created by the media is that when the 
House is not sitting Parliament is not working. 
 
2. The majority party should utilise the parliamentary programme to 
present itself and account through the programming function in a way 
that speaks to the people and keeps them informed of progress in 
creating that better quality of life.  Every year an overall theme must 
be developed that threads throughout to bind the entire programme. 
This will, for example, allow for some measure of focused debate, 
questions, etc. It will also assist with monitoring to ensure that 
Parliament systematically applies itself to the focused consideration of 
issues in order to unlock the resources and deliver. The programme 
should also be flexible to accommodate ad hoc issues, which should 
preferably be kept to a minimum. The location of the programming 
office under the auspices of the NA Table sits uncomfortably with the 
nature of the parliamentary programme, and reconsideration of the 
location of this function is required. In 1999, former Speaker Ginwala 
removed the programming function from the office of the LOGB. The 
NA Table reports directly to the Speaker, meaning that the Speaker has 
control over what is in fact a political function.  This location has given 
the Speaker the power to control the programme of the government.  
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3. The Oversight and Accountability Model, as elaborated on in chapter 3, 
should be implemented as it spells out clear systems to enhance 
oversight and to promote a culture of accountability.  
 
4. The Electoral System of Proportional Represention (PR) should be 
reconsidered and a Constituency-based Parliamentary system should be 
considered. This is a mixed system that still considers party lists, but 
promotes greater accountability of MPs to their constituencies.  
 
5. Parliament should promote monitoring and evaluation as mechanisms 
to promote the speedy implementation of legislation that affects 
service delivery. 
 
6. Parliament should evaluate the impact of legislation with delegated 
authority and should at best minimise the passing of legislation with 
such authority. Government should provide Parliament with the social 
and budgetary consequences of such legislation before it is tabled. 
 
7. The parliamentary programme should be developed in a way that 
promotes the regular attendance of Ministers in sessions of the 
National Assembly as they are Members of the National Assembly in 
addition to being members of Cabinet. 
 
8. Parliament must introduce mechanisms to ensure that Members of 
Parliament are at the constituency offices on days allocated for 
constituency work. Parliament funds the budget to run these offices 
and should hold MPs accountable for the use of the offices. 
 
The research revealed that the courts played a significant role as overseers of 
executive dominance, mainly in cases where the legislature was unable to 
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assert its authority over the executive. The research was confined to the topic 
and recommends that further study be conducted on the role of the courts as 
overseers of executive dominance in the legislative process. This could 
contribute to further enlightenment of the relationship between the spheres of 
government. 
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APPENDICE 
 
APPENDIX 1: LETTER # 
FIGURE 7: Parties represented in National Assembly 1994 
 
PARTY  VOTES RECEIVED SEATS 
African National Congress ANC 12 237 655 252 
National Party NP 3 983 690 82 
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP 2 058 294 43 
Vryheidsfront Freedom Front 
VV-
FF 
424 555 9 
Democratic Party DP 338 426 7 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania PAC 243 478 5 
African Christian Democratic 
Party 
ACDP 
88 104 2 
TOTAL  19 533 498 400 
 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission: www.iec.org.za (proper references 
Independent Electoral Commission: www.iec.org.za) 
 
FIGURE 8: Parties as at 11 June 2004 
 
PARTY  VOTES RECEIVED SEATS 
African National Congress ANC 10 878 251 279 
Democratic Alliance DA 1 931 201 50 
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP 1 088 664 28 
United Democratic Movement UDM 355 717 9 
Independent Democrats ID 269 765 7 
New National Party NNP 257 824 7 
African Christian Democratic Party ACDP 250 272 7 
Freedom Front Plus FF Plus 139 465 4 
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United Christian Democratic Party UCDP 117 792 3 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania PAC 113 512 3 
Minority Front MF 55 267 2 
Azanian People‟s Organisation Azapo 41 776 1 
  15 499 506  
 
Source: RSA Parliament, National Assembly (April – December 2004): Procedural 
Developments Issue 10, Item 19, p8 (place this in footnotes -AFTER ORDER BY 
ELECTORAL COURT) 
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FIGURE 9: State of Parties after floor crossing as at 16 September 2007 
 
PARTY  
SEATS 
BEFORE 
FLOOR-
CROSSIN
G S
E
A
T
S
 G
A
IN
E
D
 
S
E
A
T
S
 L
O
S
T
 
SEATS 
AFTER 
FLOOR-
CROSSIN
G 
African National Congress ANC 293 4 - 297 
Democratic Alliance DA 47 - - 47 
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP 23 - - 23 
United Democratic Movement UDM 6 - - 6 
Independent Democrats ID 5 - 1 4 
African Christian Democratic Party ACDP 4 - - 4 
Freedom Front Plus FF Plus 4 - - 4 
National Democratic Convention Nadec 4 - - 4 
United Christian Democratic Party UCDP 3 - - 3 
Minority Front MF 2 - - 2 
African People‟s Convention APC - 2 - 2 
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania PAC 3 - 2 1 
Azanian People‟s Organisation Azapo 1 - - 1 
Federation of Democrats FD 1 - - 1 
National Alliance NA - 1 - 1 
United Independent Front UIF 2 - 2 - 
United Party of South Africa UPSA 1 - 1 - 
Progressive Independent Movement PIM 1 - 1 - 
 
Source: RSA Parliament, National Assembly (January – December 2007): Procedural 
Developments Issue 13, Item 15, p6  
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FIGURE 10: State of parties as at 28 April 2009 43 
 
PARTY  VOTES 
RECEIVED 
SEATS 
FROM 
NATIONAL 
LIST 
SEATS 
FROM 
REGIONAL 
LISTS 
TOTAL 
NO OF 
SEATS* 
African National Congress ANC 11 650 748 126 138 264 
Democratic Alliance DA 2 945 829 32** 35 67 
Congress of the People Cope 1 311 027 16 14 30 
Inkatha Freedom Party IFP 804 260 9 9 18 
Independent Democrats ID 162 915 3 1 4 
United Democratic Movement UDM 149 680 3 1 4 
Freedom Front Plus FF 
Plus 
146 796 3 1 4 
African Christian Democratic 
Party 
ACDP 142 658 3 - 3 
United Christian Democratic 
Party 
UCDP 66 086 1 1 2 
Pan Africanist Congress of 
Azania 
PAC 48 530 1 - 1 
Minority Front MF 43 474 1 - 1 
Azanian People‟s Organisation Azapo 38 245 1 - 1 
African People‟s Convention APC 35 867 1 - 1 
  17 549 115 200 200 400 
Source: RSA Parliament, National Assembly (May – December 2009): Procedural 
Developments Issue 15, Item 5, p4 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 *Each seat in the NA represents 44 201 votes 
**The DA has no national list, so all its members are designated from its regional lists in accordance with 
item 9 of Schedule 1A to the Electoral Act 
 
 
 
 
Appendice  
 
 
118 
APPENDIX 2: LETTER #  
Below is a letter from the then Leader of Government Business to the 
Chairperson Public Accounts (SCOPA).  This is an example of executive 
participation in the parliamentary oversight in the Defence procurement 
process 
 
January 19, 2001 
 
Dear Mr Woods, 
 
l write to you about the issue of the defence acquisition, which, 
unfortunately and unnecessarily has become a matter of 
controversy. 
 
In this regard, I thank you for your letter to the President dated 8 
December, 2000, with whose authorisation I am sending this 
communication to you.  
 
The Executive has no desire to fuel controversy. However, we are 
obliged to defend the integrity of government. 
 
I enclose for your information two documents, these being: 
 
1. The January l2, 2001 Government Statement of the Defence 
Acquisition; and 
2. The January 15, 2001 letter to the President of the Minister of 
Justice on the issue of the "Heath Unit".  
From these documents, you will see that the Government contests 
the conclusions arrived at by the Auditor General and SCOPA. 
 
Furthermore, we are convinced that, in addition to the 
requirement for us to respect the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, there is no need for the "Heath Unit" to be involved in any 
"investigation" of the defence acquisition. 
 
We do not understand why you, presumably on behalf of your 
parliamentary committee, suggest that we should ignore the 
decision of the Constitutional Court on the "Heath Unit". 
 
The reasons for granting the Executive and the Legislature a 
period of a year to sort out this matter are clearly set out in the 
Constitutional Court judgement. 
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Throughout the judgement, the Court makes it clear that by 
granting a one year 'grace' period, it wishes to protect the Unit's 
work that is "being done". t refers to "persons being investigated". 
It further stated that Judge Heath "continues temporarily to be 
head of the Unit until appropriate arrangements are made for his 
replacement." 
 
With regard to this last point, the President of the Constitutional 
Court, speaking on behalf of the Court, said: 
 
"Although there may be reasons for allowing sufficient time for all 
matters to be dealt with simultaneously, there are good reasons 
for the first respondent's (Judge Heath) position as the head of the 
SW to be regularised without undue delay." 
 
In other words, the Constitutional Court required of us that Judge 
Heath be relieved of his duties without undue delay 
You will also have seen that during the course of his judgement, 
the President of the Constitutional Court makes the following 
observation, concerning the uncompleted work of the SIU: 
 
"The SIU is currently engaged in investigations into approximately 
100 organs of state said to involve 22l580 cases. The investigations 
extend over all 9 provinces and include 12 national investigations." 
 
By any account, this is a very considerable volume of work that is 
currently being handled by the SIU. As Minister Maduna has 
indicated, it would clearly be absurd and illogical for additional 
work to be given to this Unit, if this was legally possible. 
 
In the light of everything we have said above, we find it very odd 
indeed that the Auditor General, according to your letter, is also 
keen that we act without reference to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
Let me also mention that we find it strange that a parliamentary 
committee (SCOPA) considers expenditure for the acquisition of 
defence equipment as a "major diversion of public resourcesâ€¦" 
requiring to be balanced by a "social payback".  
 
As parliamentarians you must surely be aware of our common 
Constitutional obligation to maintain a national defence force, 
which, according to the Constitution, shall have the "primary 
object": 
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"to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and 
its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles 
of international law regulating the use of force." 
 
In addition, this expenditure was considered by the parliamentary 
Defence Committee and approved by parliament 
 
I would also like to deal with other matters of grave concern to 
our Government, including the President, 
 
The first of these arise from the Report of SCOPA which was 
accepted by the National Assembly on November 2, 2000. 
 
The critical issue in this regard is that SCOPA states that it is 
interested to carry out an investigation because our Government, 
foreign Governments and the prime contractors, major 
international companies, are prone to corruption and dishonesty. 
 
If this is in fact the starting point for SCOPA, it seems that the 
investigation you seek is tantamount to a fishing expedition to find 
the corruption and dishonesty you assume must have occurred. 
 
To illustrate these assertions, let me quote some passages from 
the SCOPA Report.  
 
"By many accounts the international arms trade industry 
experiences a high incidence of malpractice, with purchasing 
countries often having been the victims of very costly exploitation. 
With this in mind, the Committee has considered the transactions 
and the broader financial and fiscal implications pertaining to the 
recent South African arms purchases." 
 
Who gave what accounts to SCOPA?  
Further the Report states: 
 
"With international armaments markets havingâ€¦recovered, the 
Committee fears that the large commitments by suppliers might 
now be resisted and even reneged upon. With South Africa unlikely 
to be a serious arms purchaser over the next few decades, this 
possibility needs to be watched closely. 
 
What study has SCOPA done which shows the recovery of the 
international armaments markets and the possible response of the 
'suppliers' to this development?  
 
Further the Report says: 
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"Because of the possibilities of improper influence having been 
exerted in certain of these selections, further investigation is 
considered necessary." 
 
What assessment did SCOPA carry out to establish the existence of 
these 'possibilities', which are these selections and why them and 
not others?  
 
Further, again, the Report states: 
 
"The Committee is concerned about the possible role played by 
influential parties in determining the choice of subcontractors by 
prime contractors." 
 
What work was done by SCOPA to establish that there was a 
possible role by which influential parties? Do these include 
members of the Government? Which prime contractors and which 
subcontractors would have been influenced by these influential 
parties? 
 
Further still, the Reports asserts: 
 
"The government-to-government agreements, which make 
references to NIPs commitments, while noble in intent and of 
some influence in official international communications, have 
questionable contractual or legal standing." 
 
What is questionable about these agreements? What is meant by 
"some influence in official international communications"? Is the 
suggestion being made that the Governments entered into 
meaningless agreements only for propaganda purposes? If this is 
so, on what basis is this allegation being made? 
 
The seriousness with which you take your assumption that our 
Government, the trans-national corporations and foreign 
Governments are prone to corruption and dishonesty, is illustrated 
by the steps you have taken to ensure that investigations take 
place.  
 
As you know, the acquisition process was led by a Ministerial 
Committee, which was chaired by the then Deputy President. The 
committee reported to the Cabinet. The Cabinet gave final 
approval for the acquisition. 
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This Committee dealt with the prime contracts and not the 
subcontracts which are a matter between the prime contractors 
and whoever they subcontract to.  
 
The members of the Cabinet Committee were the then Deputy 
President, Thabo Mbeki, and Ministers Joe Modise, Trevor Manuel, 
Alec Erwin and Stella Sigcau.  
 
The prime contractors are Blohm + Voss, Thompson CSF, Ferrostaal 
AG, Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH, Agusta un'Azienda 
FINMECCANICA S.p.A, British Aerospace, British Aerospace (SAAB) 
and others, all of which are well-known and prestigious 
international companies. 
 
The foreign governments involved are those of the UK, Sweden, 
Germany and Italy. 
 
Your assumption of corruption and dishonesty is therefore 
specifically directed against these personalities, governments and 
corporations. 
 
Natural justice demands that you both substantiate the allegation 
that the persons, governments and corporations we have 
mentioned are prone to corruption and dishonesty and provide 
even the most rudimentary or elementary evidence that any or all 
of these acted in a corrupt and dishonest manner.  
 
I believe that it is a most serious matter indeed for our parliament 
or any section of it, to level charges of corruption against foreign 
governments and corporations without producing evidence to back 
up such allegations. 
 
All of us have a duty to build friendly relations with the peoples of 
the world. We cannot achieve this by arbitrarily and falsely 
presenting these in the negative light that some have defined as 
being their duty with regard to our Government and country. 
 
Least of all can it be the task of our Parliament to act in this 
manner. 
 
As we have said, it is clear from your Report to parliament that 
you have a significant amount of written information in your 
possession and, presumably, other evidence. 
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This should enable you to present the information and evidence we 
suggest you present, substantiating the extremely damaging 
assumptions you state in your Report to parliament. 
 
Obviously, should you have any evidence indicating possible 
criminal misconduct on the part of any of the individuals and 
corporations I have mentioned, you should hand it over to the 
Police Service. 
 
In this regard, I also believe that any information you may have on 
Members of parliament, including Ministers who are members of 
the National Assembly, should immediately be brought to the 
attention of the Speaker. 
 
The rules, I believe, prescribe that any investigation pursuant to 
this information would not fall within the competence of SCOPA. 
 
You may also wish, as you inform the Speaker, to request her to 
take steps to ensure that the country is influenced about the 
alleged misconduct, provided that this is legal. We would have no 
problem with that to the extent that it relates to members of the 
Executive. 
 
The next matter I would like to raise concerns the interaction 
between SCOPA and the Executive on the issue of the defence 
acquisition. 
 
SCOPA has proceeded to reach conclusions on this matter without 
having heard the Cabinet. This is despite the request the Ministers 
made to meet SCOPA.  
 
As you can see from the documents we have enclosed, we are of 
the firm view that because this meeting did not take place, SCOPA 
has seriously misdirected itself and thus arrived at decisions that 
are not substantiated by any facts. 
 
It is difficult to understand how SCOPA could have gone as far as it 
has, investigating a decision taken by the Cabinet, without asking 
the people who took the decision any questions that SCOPA might 
have felt they should ask. 
 
We hope this strange manner of proceeding was not driven by a 
determination to find the Executive guilty at all costs, based on 
the assumption we have already mentioned, that the Executive is 
prone to corruption and dishonesty.  
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It might be necessary that both the Legislature and the Executive 
try to draw the necessary conclusions from this experience, to 
ensure that we do not repeat the obviously wrong things that have 
happened during the handling by parliament of the defence 
acquisition issue. 
 
In the meantime, I believe that those who occupy positions of 
leadership in parliament, including yourself, will have to make the 
matter clear to parliament as a whole, why it is that at least 
SCOPA believes that the Executive is prone to corrupt and 
dishonest practice. 
 
As you are aware and as Minister Maduna indicated in his letter to 
the President, in her public statement issued on 27 December, 
2000, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Hon Frene 
Ginwala, makes the following comments: 
 
"The Speaker is not aware of any resolution of Parliament or the 
National Assembly instructing the President to issue any 
Proclamation regarding the work of the Heath commission. Any 
such action would be of dubious legal and constitutional validity."  
 
Further: 
 
A Committee of the National Assembly has no authority to 
subcontract its work to any of these (investigative) bodies, or 
require them to undertake any particular activity, or to report 
directly to the Committee. Nor are Chairpersons expected to act 
on major issues without the agreement of the Committee. Such 
direction as the Assembly may wish to give would require specific 
referral by a resolution of the National Assembly, and be subject 
to the procedures provided in relevant legislation." 
 
In his letter to the President, Minister Maduna reports that you 
informed the investigative units that SCOPA was in contact with a 
foreign "forensic accounting facility" that could draw up the terms 
of reference of the investigation you seek.  
 
We must therefore include this unnamed "facility" among the 
bodies which, according to the Speaker, cannot be subcontracted 
by SCOPA. 
 
From the statement of the Speaker it is clear that your letter to 
the President was ultra vires. This is true of any action you might 
have taken to cause any investigative unit to carry out any 
investigation. 
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This has put the Executive and its organs in an embarrassing 
situation, to the extent that you, and others, have conveyed the 
false information that the National Assembly had requested that 
various organs should carry out an investigation. 
 
It is therefore necessary that specific steps be taken to correct 
this situation, to ensure that all of us, including SCOPA and you, 
respect the rule of law. 
 
There is an additional matter I would like to raise with regard to 
your communication dated 21 November, 2000, to the "Joint 
Investigating Initiative", in which you mention the "international 
forensic accounting facility".  
 
In this letter you say: 
 
"Against uncertainties created through the media last week, of 
possible interference in the investigation by government, it was 
felt appropriate to mention this offer as a possible means through 
which SCOPA could assure the public of a comprehensive 
investigation." 
 
According to this statement, because of what the press said, you 
became so fearful of possible government interference that you 
felt that you should accept the offer made by some "international 
facility". 
 
Seemingly, this "facility" made its offer just on time to provide a 
way out of the "uncertainties created through the media"! 
 
You were quite happy to accept the judgement of the media about 
the intentions of the Government. This was presumably because, 
as we have said, you know that the Government is prone to 
corruption and dishonesty. 
 
Accordingly, according to this view, the Government must be 
assumed to have acted corruptly with regard to the defence 
acquisition, and would therefore, naturally, seek to cover up its 
misdeeds! 
 
Whatever you say about our own investigative units in your letter 
to then, you also felt that they did not enjoy sufficient credibility 
with "the public" to be able to reassure this "public" of the 
integrity and honesty of the investigation, if the foreign "facility" 
was not involved in the investigation.  
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On what information do you base this assessment of the Auditor 
General, the Public Protector and the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, all of whom have been confirmed in their positions 
by parliament? 
 
I am certain that all these matters will need to be explained, 
including who this "facility" is, with whom they have discussed and 
when, why they felt that they should set the terms of reference 
for the inquiry you seek, who felt it appropriate to mention the 
offer to the investigative units, and so on. 
I am not raising these questions so that you should report to the 
Executive. I mention them because they cause grave concern to 
the Executive, which is interested to hear straightforward 
answers. 
 
Parliament will have to deal with these and other questions, as we 
have to respect the principle contained in our Constitution of the 
separation of powers. 
 
In your 8 December, 2000 letter to the President, urging the 
involvement of the "Heath Unit" in the investigation, you say: 
 
"SCOPA's reasons for including a role for the Special Investigations 
Unit (SIU), as one of the investigating parties, related to the SIU's 
particular powers and areas of competence and its relevant 
experience. It was apparent to us that the comprehensive 
investigation advocated would be weakened by its absence - 
mainly due to its authority in civil type actions and the role which 
could be played by its special tribunal arrangement." 
 
I am certain that you are aware of the fact that in his letter to 
Minister Maduna, dated November 22, 2000, the Public Protector 
said: 
 
"With regard to the application for a proclamation by the SIU, I am 
of the opinion that such a proclamation is not necessary at the 
present juncture. 
 
"There is no evidence of any unlawful appropriation or expenditure 
of public money and accordingly no need for the SIU to recover any 
assets or public money; 
 
"The application by the SIU, is based primarily on the Special 
Review by the Auditor-General and does not raise any new 
evidence. 
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"I believe that such a proclamation by the President, is not 
necessary at this stage and that the application be pended for 
consideration by the President at a later date, if necessary." 
 
I am also certain that you are familiar with the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, which contained the following view: 
 
"The functions that the head of the SIU (Judge Heath) has to 
perform are executive functions, that wider our system of 
government are ordinarily performed by the police, members of 
the staff of the National Prosecuting Authority or the state 
attorney." 
 
It is clear that you disagree with the views both of the Public 
Protector and the Constitutional Court, believing that there are 
public funds to be recovered and that neither the police, nor the 
Prosecuting Authority nor the state attorney have the same 
competence to act as does the SIU. 
 
Accordingly, with regard to the paragraph of your letter to the 
President quoted above, it would help us enormously if you 
favoured us with a response to the following questions: 
 
(a) what are the particular powers, areas of competence and 
relevant experience to which you refer, distinct from the powers, 
area of competence and relevant experience of our judiciary? 
 
(b) in what way are the competencies mentioned under (a) above 
especially relevant to the determination of the truth about the 
defence acquisition, which determination of the truth would be 
weakened by the absence of the SIU? 
 
We have publicly indicated our desire and willingness to have some 
of our Ministers meet SCOPA. I trust that, this time, this will 
actually take place. 
 
Further, to enable us to give the proper and necessary direction to 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the South African 
Police Service, I request that SCOPA indicates to me the specific 
matters it wants investigated and why, providing the prima facie 
evidence which it believes justifies this investigation.  
 
As of now, we do not have this prima facie eyidence and are 
completely at a loss as to what the loudly proclaimed wrongdoing 
consists in.  
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Parliament is, of course, at liberty to interact with the Public 
Protector and the Auditor-General as it wishes. 
 
Let me reiterate the commitment contained in the attached 
statements, that the Executive would co-operate fully with any 
investigation necessitated by information that suggests that 
corruption might have occurred in the process of the defence 
acquisition. 
 
Whoever has such information should make it available to any 
investigate unit of their choice, the Executive, as well as the 
general public, if they so wish. 
 
The Government will also act vigorously to defend itself and the 
country against any malicious misinformation campaign intended 
to discredit the Government and destabilise the country.  
 
I would like to inform you that copies of this letter and the 
enclosures will be sent to: 
 
(a) the Speaker of the National Assembly; 
(b) all members of SCOPA; 
(c) the heads of the investigative units, including the SIU; 
(d) the Chairpersons of the Defence, Trade and Industry, Finance 
and Public Enterprises parliamentary portfolio committees, as well 
as the parliamentary Audit Committee; 
(e) the principal contracting companies; 
(f) the relevant foreign governments; and 
(g) the media. 
 
The President has asked me to assure you that he did, indeed, give 
urgent attention to your request, as you asked. 
 
Similarly, he and I respectfully request that you give urgent 
attention to all the matters raised in this letter. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
JACOB G. ZUMA 
Leader of Government Business. 
 
 
Response  
 
29 January 2001 
To: Hon. Mr Jacob Zuma 
Leader of Government Business 
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Dear Colleague 
 
I acknowledge receipt of a copy of your letter dated January 19th 
addressed to the Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts. The Report to which you refer is a document of the 
National Assembly after it was adopted on November 3rd, and I am 
responding to you as the responsible Presiding Officer. 
 
Your letter raises issues of procedure on the conduct of relations 
between the Legislature and the Executive, as well as specific 
concerns of substance, and I will take the opportunity to address 
both matters. 
 
I was pleased to note that in the President's broadcast, the 
statement by the Director General, and in your letter there are 
expressions of support for Parliament's constitutional 
responsibilities. 
 
However, I am perturbed by the concerns you raise, and the 
National Assembly will need to consider them very seriously and 
rectify any problems. I would like at this stage to make some 
preliminary comments on some of the issues. 
 
1. The Special Review by the Auditor General of the Selection 
 process of Strategic Defence Packages for the Acquisition of 
 Armaments at the Department of Defence was correctly 
 referred to SCOPA which has the responsibility to consider  such 
reports and enquire into the issues that are raised and  report 
to the National Assembly 
 
 In the Report adopted by the Assembly, SCOPA indicated it 
 intended to pursue a number of issues on which it had yet  to 
report. The Committee is continuing its work on these  and 
will also consider and report to the National Assembly  on the 
matters raised by the Executive that are within its  competence. 
 
2. On December 27th, I issued a statement on the Report as 
submitted by SCOPA and adopted by the National Assembly. [This 
statement is attached for your information.] 
 
The Report adopted by the Assembly explicitly recommends "an 
independent and expert forensic investigation" for which the 
Committee will prepare a brief, and further "an exploratory 
meeting convened by the Committee" to which four named and 
"any other appropriate investigative body" should be invited. The 
Report does not recommend that any or all of these bodies must 
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be included, nor does it refer to the procedural and constitutional 
issues that would arise should Parliament wish to involve or 
instruct either independent or executive agencies or organisations 
in its inquiries. [The opinion of the Law Advisor after we re-
examined the Report is attached for your information.] 
 
Had there been a recommendation that the Executive authorise 
the Special Investigative Unit or any other organ of the Executive, 
I would have immediately drawn the attention of the relevant 
Minister as has been our practice for over a year. 
 
However, it is now evident that there are differences among 
members of SCOPA on what the report was intended to convey. If 
it deems it necessary, the Committee may pursue this and make a 
specific recommendation to the Assembly. 
 
I want to take the opportunity to express my view, that it is within 
the competence of the Legislature after due consideration of the 
legal and procedural requirements, to make a recommendation to 
the Executive on areas within its jurisdiction, which the Executive 
may choose to accept or reject. Parliament's authority is 
persuasive. The Legislature cannot instruct the Executive, except 
to the extent that legislation it enacts defines and sets the legal 
framework within which the Executive undertakes its 
constitutional responsibilities. Parliament retains oversight over 
the manner in which the Executive and state organs perform their 
functions. 
 
3. You have raised a number of serious concerns on the 
methods used by SCOPA, the perceived assumptions and the 
information on which conclusions have been based. I have no doubt 
that the Chairperson of SCOPA to whom your letter was addressed 
will have tabled it for consideration by the Committee. However, 
as the report was adopted by the Assembly, I am referring your 
letter to SCOPA and requesting the Committee to report to the 
Assembly on those issues that are within their competence and in 
particular on their investigations 
 
I had previously drawn the attention of the Chairperson of the 
Committee and Mr. Feinstein to Rule136 which states: 
 
"If any information charging an Assembly member comes before a 
committee, the committee may not proceed upon that 
information, but must report it to the Speaker without delay." 
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Subsequently, the Chairperson sent me some documents submitted 
to the Committee in which reference is made to current and 
previous members of the National Assembly, but indicated that he 
did not consider that in themselves these provided evidence of 
misconduct. I have studied these, and agree that the allegations 
are not substantiated. Accordingly, I did not consider that there 
was a basis for referral to the disciplinary committee nor to an ad 
hoc committee of the House. Should evidence of misconduct by any 
member be submitted in future, I will act on it immediately, and 
as is customary, the House will be informed. 
 
5. I can assure you that the Assembly, and all Members of 
Parliament are fully aware of their responsibility to provide the 
Police Service with any information on possible criminal activities. 
You have also requested SCOPA to provide you with particular 
information that it might have or acquire. 
However, except where information and documents are submitted 
to a Committee when it meets in public, disclosure is governed by 
particular rules. If the public was excluded from a meeting of the 
Committee the evidence or a report or summary thereof may not 
be published or disclosed, except with the permission of the 
Committee, or by order of the Speaker, or by resolution of the 
Assembly. Further the permission, order or resolution authorising 
the publication or disclosure may provide that specific parts of, or 
names mentioned in, the document in question may not be 
published or disclosed. 
 
If the evidence has not been made public, the committee could in 
its published report to the Assembly merely make reference to the 
type of evidence without providing names or details, and indicate 
whether it wishes to make this available to any other body for 
purposes of investigation. It is therefore possible to proceed 
without premature disclosure and compromising police 
investigations. The Law Advisors will work with the Committee on 
this matter. 
 
6. Your concerns regarding directions to the National Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the South African Police Service are 
valid. However, the Chairperson is now fully aware that SCOPA 
cannot instruct any of the Investigating Agencies and has already 
informed the "Joint Investigating Initiative" of this. [Letter of 21 
November attached.] Any requests for specific investigations 
required by the Assembly will be submitted through the 
appropriate channels. 
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7. I do not know what the view of the Committee has been on 
the offer of assistance to SCOPA by "an international accounting 
agency". However, when I learnt of this I informed the Chairperson 
of a decision of the Joint Rules Committee that all offers of 
support from outside of Parliament or the Executive, or requests 
for such support should be made through the Presiding Officers. 
No offer to SCOPA has been received or referred to my office. 
 
I trust, Deputy President, that I have been able to clarify some of 
the issues, and assure you that the Assembly will address all the 
matters raised in vour letter. 
 
In order to facilitate communication with the Executive and ensure 
that recommendations of the Assembly are considered timeously, I 
have for the past year been writing to specific members of the 
Executive drawing attention to reports and particular 
recommendations concerning their portfolios, and requesting that 
the Assembly be advised of action that is taken. This is in addition 
to the previous practice where the Secretary to Parliament sent 
reports and resolutions adopted by the Assembly to the Director 
General in the Presidency. The responses to the recommendations 
made last year are currently being reviewed and we will be 
following up on them. 
 
We are all still developing our understanding and trying to give 
effect to the constitutional relationship between the Executive 
and the Legislature. We have appreciated the role you have played 
since assuming the responsibility of Leader of Government 
Business. 
 
However, as recent events have emphasised, much still remains to 
be done, and we need to continuously review and improve the 
communication and relationship between the Executive and 
Legislature. 
 
As your letter was widely distributed and made public, I will do 
the same with this response. 
 
Yours sincerely 
F.N. Ginwala 
Speaker 
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BILLS FAST TRACKED SINCE 1999 
 
1999 
South African Sports Commission Second Amendment Bill  
Municipal Structures Amendment Bill  
South African Airways Unallocatable Debt Bill  
Administrative Justice Bill  
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill  
Preferential Procurement Bill  
Education Laws Amendment Bill  
 
2000 
Chiropractors, Homeopaths and Allied Health Services Professions Amendment Bill  
National Lotteries Amendment Bill  
Municipal Electoral Amendment Bill  
Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill  
Cross Boundary Municipality Bill  
African Renaissance   
Housing Amendment Bill  
National Health Laboratory Services Bill  
South African Rail Commuter Corporation Limited Financial Arrangements Bill  
Termination of Integration Intake Bill  
Demobilisation Amendment Bill (Integration Bill)  
Constitution of South Africa Amendment Bill (Constitutional Amendment Bill)  
South African Sports Commission Amendment Bill  
 
2002 
Loss and Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Bill  
Local Government Municipal Structures Amendment Bill  
Constitutional Amendment Bill  
National Environmental Management Amendment Bill  
 
2003 
Electoral Laws Second Amendment Bill  
 
2004 
Division of Revenue Bill  
 
2005 
Division of Revenue Bill  
Constitutional Matters Amendment Bill  
 
2006 
Division of Revenue Bill  
2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Bill  
 
 
 
 
